

THE *Nation*

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 154

NEW YORK · SATURDAY · JANUARY 10, 1942

NUMBER 2

IN THIS ISSUE

THE SHAPE OF THINGS

EDITORIALS

Hanging Together
Roosevelt Must Act
Manila Falls

ARTICLES

Production Politics *by I. F. Stone*
Balance Sheet of the War *by Donald W. Mitchell*
Hitler's Restless Reich *by Heinz Pol*
Don't Plan for Collapse—II *by Harold Strauss*
Everybody's Business *by Keith Hutchison*
In the Wind
A Native at Large *by Jonathan Daniels*

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

New Year Poem *by George Barker*
A Letter from Paris
Roosevelt's State Papers *by Charles Curtis Munz*
Bedtime Stories *by Joseph Wood Krutch*
The Problem of Power *by Reinhold Niebuhr*
More About South America *by Karl Loewenstein*
Clara Barton *by Grace Adams*
In Brief
Drama: The Unbeautiful People
by Joseph Wood Krutch
Records *by B. H. Haggin*

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

Editor and Publisher
FREDA KIRCHWEY

Managing Editor
ROBERT BENDINER

Washington Editor
I. F. STONE

Literary Editor
MARGARET MARSHALL

Associate Editors

KEITH HUTCHISON MAXWELL S. STEWART

Assistant Editor
RICHARD H. ROVERE

Music Critic
B. H. HAGGIN

Drama Critic
JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

Board of Contributing Editors

NORMAN ANGELL • JONATHAN DANIELS • LOUIS FISCHER
REINHOLD NIEBUHR • J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

Business Manager
HUGO VAN ARX

Advertising Manager
MARY HOWARD ELLISON

Published weekly and copyright, 1942, in the U. S. A. by The Nation, Inc., 55 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, December 13, 1879, at the Post Office of New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879. Washington Editorial Bureau: 856 National Press Building.

The Shape of Things

21

24

25

26

27

28

30

32

36

37

38

39

39

40

42

42

44

44

45

45

46

47

MR. EDEN, BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY, WAS able to give a very cheerful report on his return from Moscow, where he had spent two weeks in conferences with Stalin and other Russian leaders. The British and Russians now seem to be working together in genuine harmony and to have banished the suspicions which poisoned relations even after Hitler began his eastern offensive. Mr. Eden declared: "When our communiqué states our identity of views on all questions relating to the conduct of the war, those words are not mere diplomatic jargon; they tell the literal and absolute truth." The Foreign Secretary had been able to see for himself the effects of the relentless pressure against the Nazi lines. And he was able to announce that although Soviet production had suffered heavily in the invasion, industry was making a come-back and output had begun to climb again. In the past week the Red Army has made significant progress in more than one area. On the Moscow front it has driven new wedges into the German line and has succeeded in practically surrounding the strongly fortified town of Mozhaïsk, which is the kingpin of the Nazi position. In the south the recapture of Kerch and Feodosiya in the eastern Crimea promises to bring relief to the garrison of Sevastopol, which has stoutly beaten off every Nazi assault for three months. And if this should prove possible, German evacuation of the whole peninsula and a retreat of the Nazi forces still clinging to the edge of the Donetz basin are likely to follow.

★

THE DESCENT OF THE BRITISH COMMANDOS on two widely separated Nazi outposts in Norway not only provided thrilling holiday reading but produced significant results. Nine or more German ships were sunk, a considerable number of prisoners taken, installations destroyed, a hundred Norwegian volunteers brought back to England, and German shipping interrupted all along the coast. The combined land, air, and sea operations seem to have proceeded like clockwork, and casualties were very light apart from the loss of eleven planes covering the more extensive of the two raids, that on the islands of Vågsoe and Mäløy. The value of attacks of

this nature is not to be measured by the immediate dividends. The intangible profits are harder to assess but probably still more important. There is good evidence, borne out by the raids themselves, that the Nazi forces in Norway have been reduced both in quality and quantity. After all, seasoned winter warriors are badly needed in Russia. The knowledge that the British can swoop down with blazing tommy-guns is not going to improve the nerves of the German garrison, while the High Command is going to be concerned lest these forays prove the prelude to a full-scale invasion. Nazi fury sought a futile outlet by the slaughter of eleven Norse prisoners at Stavanger. Such tactics cannot expunge the lift given to Norwegian spirits by the raids; they can only strengthen Norwegian hatred and determination. We hope it may prove possible for the British to carry out such raids with increasing frequency not only on Norway but at many different points on the long Nazi-held coastline, which has hitherto been an Axis asset owing to the facilities it offered for carrying out air and submarine raids. Since it is far too extensive to be fully guarded, it can be turned into a liability as Allied strength grows.

★

JAPAN'S DEFEAT AT CHANGSHA AT THE hands of the Chinese comes as a welcome relief after the succession of Japanese triumphs elsewhere in the Pacific. The attack was the fourth attempt the Japanese have made to capture this important city, and the setback appears to have been even more serious than those ending the previous attempts. Both the Japanese and the Chinese tactics seem to have paralleled closely those employed in the October drive. On both occasions the Japanese closed the Milo River and marched down the Hankow-Canton railway virtually unopposed by the Chinese forces. But as the Japanese neared the city, the Chinese attacked from both flanks and the rear, trapping the invader and inflicting tremendous losses. In striking contrast to reports from the Philippines, there is no mention of the use of Japanese planes in support of the ground forces. This suggests a very definite limit to Japanese air resources which must ultimately become apparent on other fronts. But the fact that Japan was unable to use planes in no sense detracts from the victory of the Chinese, who have increasingly demonstrated their ability to deal with whatever mode of attack the Japanese choose to employ.

★

THE STATE DEPARTMENT DOESN'T LIKE "free" movements. It has said so. It has advised "free" Americans to steer clear of them. It has called the De Gaullists "so-called Free French," as if to suggest that the authentic Free French are the functionaries who sit at Vichy with a Nazi noose around their necks. To justify its outrageous attempt to oust the forces of Admiral

Muselier from St. Pierre and Miquelon, the department has gone so far as to imply that the Free French are not even French. Through its "utensil"—to use Winston Churchill's happy epithet—Arthur Krock, the State Department has put out a curious apologia for its behavior: it pretends that its opposition to De Gaullist control of the islands was necessary under the provision of the Havana convention which held that no non-American state should be permitted to attempt, directly or indirectly, "to replace another non-American state in the sovereignty . . . which it exercised over any territory located in the Americas." The absurdity of classifying the Free French coup, even if it had not been indorsed by the almost unanimous vote of the population, as a change of sovereignty is obvious to any but a State Department mind. The argument has certainly made no visible impression on the public, which continues in letters to the press and to public officials to express its distaste for our government's violation of the principles of freedom for which the war presumably is being fought. (The State Department is said to have received many protests addressed to the "so-called State Department.") Meanwhile Admiral Muselier remains in St. Pierre, and the French fleet has not yet been turned over to Hitler.

★

FREE SPANIARDS ARE EVEN LESS POPULAR than Free Frenchmen with the reactionaries in the State Department. Republican or Socialist, worker or minister, all Spanish Loyalists look alike to the Berles and Longs: they all look like reds. It must be embarrassing to these officials to observe the recent behavior of Dr. Negrín, last Premier of Free Spain. Dr. Negrín, whose followers are shut out of a country to which representatives of Franco and Pétain have easy access, has performed a service for the Allied cause which even a State Department official might recognize as patriotic and courageous. As one of twenty scientists he volunteered to help Dr. J. B. S. Haldane test the effects on the body of various gases under high pressure, with the object of making escape from submarines less hazardous. A news dispatch describes one of the experiments in these words:

For hours Dr. Negrín and the other volunteers have been cramped into a small steel chamber. They have undergone convulsions as severe as those in an extreme epileptic fit. They have had almost unendurable headaches. They have been in frequent danger of death from air embolisms.

Here we have an act of gallantry which is beyond praise. When one recalls the not too distant past and the treatment of Dr. Negrín's country in its blackest hour by the British government then in power, the magnanimity of his service stands out in bold relief. The explanation is, of course, simple. Dr. Negrín is one of those suspect cases—a man who is willing to risk death for freedom.

A NEW WAVE OF UNREST IS SWEEPING OVER France. In Brest a "serious incident," the nature of which has not yet been disclosed, has led to suspension of the city council. In Paris there have been bombings of Germans, riots suppressed by machine-guns, and the execution of an unknown number of hostages. Not only Nazis but French collaborationists are feeling the sharp edge of popular anger. Yves Paringaux, who is believed to have been murdered, was a fascist of long standing and the chief assistant of Pierre Pucheu, who owed to Nazi support his appointment to the key position of Minister of the Interior in the Vichy government. Simultaneously with this outbreak of violence the German-controlled Paris press has opened a new campaign against Pétain, who is accused of lack of zeal in collaboration, and German sources have been hinting at growing strain between Vichy and Berlin. We suspect that this effort to depict the Marshal as stiffening in his opposition to Germany should not be taken at its face value. The maintenance of the Pétain myth is important to the Nazis, for while the ancient Marshal still commands some popular respect, no open revolt against Vichy is likely. Moreover, it makes it easier for our State Department to keep up its appeasement policy, for which the only possible justification is the theory that Pétain still has some freedom of action. Any indication that belief in this theory is waning is always a signal for the kept Paris press to assail Vichy for being too pro-American. We must not be misled by such maneuvers. We must not forget that the only obstacle to Nazi insistence on full collaboration is the determined opposition of the mass of the French people. We shall only confuse and weaken that opposition by continuing to appease Vichy.

✱

THE RESIGNATION OF GANDHI FROM THE leadership of the All-India Congress Party and the tentative gesture of cooperation with Britain made by the party's executive committee provide the British government with a new and favorable opportunity to enlist the whole-hearted support of the Indian people in the war effort. In order to achieve this end it will be necessary for London to give India forthright pledges of self-determination after the war and meanwhile to admit Indian leaders to a real partnership in the government. These are, in effect, the proposals made by a group of fifteen distinguished Indian moderates in a cabled appeal to Mr. Churchill to act while there is yet time. The expiration of the term of Lord Linlithgow, the present Viceroy, makes possible a change in policy which could be dramatized either by the appointment to this office of some Englishman known to India as a genuine friend or better still by naming an Indian commanding the respect of all parties. Gandhi resigned because personally he felt compelled to continue the civil-disobedi-

ence movement for freedom of speech against all wars, while the majority of the Congress executives believed that this attitude was no longer realistic now that the war was approaching the gates of India. Its resolution indicating a shift toward collaboration with the British made it clear that this move was dictated by sympathy with the victims of aggression rather than by a feeling that Britain itself deserved support. "Only a free and independent India," it declared, "can be in a position to undertake the defense of the country on a national basis and be of help in furtherance of the larger causes that are emerging from the storm of war." The next step is plainly up to the British government.

✱

IF ST. ADOLF OF BERCHTESGADEN AGREES TO the plan for a new *Ersatz* religion worked out by Apostle Rosenberg, the German people are in for some of the grimmest hilarity since the Saint's misbegotten beer-cellar putsch. The budding Faith has thirty articles, the first of which is to grab all the property, including the churches and chapels, belonging to existing religions. This is not as harsh as it may seem because these other religions "will not be tolerated in Germany by the National Reich Church" (Article Four) and therefore will have no use for places of worship anyway. Mr. Rosenberg, with a sense of delicacy rare for a prophet, insists that "these living monuments of German culture" will be subjected to "no structural alterations" whatever (Article Six); far from intending any such desecration, the new faith will simply "remove from the altars of all churches the Bible, the cross, and religious objects" (Article Eighteen), in place of which "will be set that which must be venerated by the German people and therefore is by God, our most saintly book, 'Mein Kampf,' and to the left of that a sword" (Article Nineteen). For "the Christian cross" will be substituted "the symbol of invincible Germany—the swastika" (Article Thirty). Nothing sacrilegious is intended by these provisions; they will merely implement the National Reich Church's "one objective: to destroy that Christian belief imported into Germany in the unfortunate year 800" (Article Five). As a matter of fact, the good Nazis who file into church on Saturday nights ("with festive illumination") will be instructed to "recognize God and his eternal work" (Article Nine), though of course "there will be no kneeling . . . as this action is undignified to a German" (Article Twenty-six).

✱

CHARLES LINDBERGH'S OFFER TO SERVE IN the army air force was inevitable, and perhaps some who opposed his conduct during the past two years think he should be given a chance to redeem himself. We are all for unity and as much sweetness and light as the traffic will bear, but to give Mr. Lindbergh any important role in the war effort or even to accept his advice at face value

would seem to us to go considerably beyond the limits of safety. What might be a sporting gesture in the annual Rose Bowl game would come close to criminal irresponsibility in a war in which every decent tradition of the United States is at stake. What would be the spirit of men sent into battle by an officer who thinks that "this war was lost by England and France even before it was declared"; who was certain that Germany's air force could beat any coalition that might oppose it; who asserted that "we cannot win this war for England regardless of how much assistance we send" and warned us against fighting a war at the side of that country lest it betray us just as it "turned against France"; who declared publicly, "It would not be best to see Germany defeated; I would prefer to see neither side win"? For that matter, what could be the morale of the ex-Colonel himself in serving a government whose right to office he has repeatedly questioned? And as for his "advice," which Secretary of War Stimson politely announced "will be gratefully received and carefully considered," wasn't it scuttled at Pearl Harbor by an enemy that could never attack across a span of three thousand miles of water? Or was it perhaps beaten to a pulp by a Red Army that couldn't fight?

★

THE EXTENT TO WHICH PRIVATE BUSINESS groups have hampered the defense effort out of fear that their control over industry would be endangered by increased production is stressed by Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold in his annual report to Congress. Mr. Arnold asserts that "there is not an organized basic industry in the United States which has not been restricting production by some device or other." This will not be news to readers of *The Nation* who have been following I. F. Stone's analyses of the shortcomings of the defense effort, but it is none the less a powerful indictment of organized business and the responsible government officials who have permitted this situation to exist in a period of national emergency. The recent ban on the production of automobiles and tires indicates that the government's policies are changing under the duress of war. But as Mr. Arnold points out, the problem is not confined to a few industries. We face a fundamental conflict of interest when we seek to get maximum production through the instrumentality of men who must, as part of their jobs, take into account the post-war capital value of the industries they control.

★

EVERY AVAILABLE PIECE OF EVIDENCE indicates that the government is strictly living up to the high standards it has set for itself in the treatment of aliens from enemy countries. It has so far attempted no general reclassification of such aliens, and perhaps that is just as well, although refugees from Hitler's terror naturally dislike finding themselves in the category of "enemies." But a general separation of the sheep from the

goats would prove an enormous job and might easily lead to abuses in quarters where prejudice runs strong. The Department of Justice has adopted the sensible attitude that most aliens are doubtless pro-American and are neither to be discriminated against by the government nor bullied by misguided citizens. Certain minor restrictions have been uniformly imposed on all aliens technically rated as "enemy." They have been ordered to turn in to the police short-wave radios, cameras, and firearms and to give a week's notice before taking trips. Such inconveniences will be accepted without complaint by refugees, who are only too glad to feel that their Nazi or Fascist compatriots are under surveillance and restraint. At the same time civilian boards are being set up in every city to pass on cases of aliens charged with acts of disloyalty. While not all of them are satisfactory as to personnel, the system promises a generally unbiased consideration of each case on its merits. We have every reason to hope that under the enlightened guidance of Attorney General Biddle the alien problem will be handled with tolerance and wisdom as well as firmness.

Hanging Together

THE Declaration of the United Nations, like the Declaration of Independence, is a recognition of Benjamin Franklin's horse sense, for "we must indeed hang together, or, assuredly, we shall all hang separately." It has taken a long time for this simple idea to be accepted, but now the United States, in common with many other of the signatories, has felt the hot breath of the executioner on its neck, and we acknowledge that the price of survival is to fight together, work together, and stick together. At Washington twenty-six nations have mutually pledged to each other their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor. They have agreed to employ their full resources, military and economic, in the fight against the Axis powers, to cooperate with one another, and to make no separate armistice or peace. This is a solemn oath, and if it is to be honored in the spirit as in the letter the signatory nations must be prepared to make more than a material contribution; they must also endeavor to overcome their jealousies and sink their prejudices.

A good start has been made in giving practical effect to the Declaration of the United Nations by the agreement reached in Washington for unified command in the Far East. We hope there will be no heart-burnings in the American services at the appointment of a British commander-in-chief. General Wavell has made a great record already in this war. He has won his victories against heavy odds, and his defeats have been in the face of even heavier odds. The decision to place him in charge of all the Allied forces, land, sea, and air, in the southwest Pacific is a very wise one; the course of the war

has proved that victory demands the complete coordination of all arms. The first Libyan campaign was won because Wavell secured perfect cooperation among the British army, navy, and air force. And in so doing he proved his tact, for on that occasion his authority extended only to the army. It is a quality likely to be often needed in carrying out his new task with the aid of colleagues from half a dozen allied nations.

Unified command cannot be confined to the Far East, and it is probable that before this issue of *The Nation* appears the Washington conferees will have reached agreement in regard to other theaters. A most pressing need is for a single commander-in-chief for the Atlantic, where we must be prepared for a new and furious offensive in the next few months. Even more urgent is the case for the creation of a joint General Staff to work on problems of total strategy and supply. There is little point in setting up unified command in the Far East or elsewhere if decisions as to what reinforcements and supplies shall be sent there are to be taken separately in Washington and London. Presumably President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill have reached an agreement as to the distribution between the different fronts of men and material now available or soon to be available. But new arrangements will have to be made as the fortunes of war change and sway, and in deciding how to dispose of our pooled production to the best advantage we must also provide for a pool of brains and information.

Hints have come from Washington of some kind of Anglo-American supply council which would coordinate the industrial efforts of the two countries. Some progress in the standardization of weapons is believed to have been made since the Lend-Lease Act was passed, but it is probable that a great deal of duplication of effort could be avoided by a closer gearing of supply services. Some kind of continuous joint supervision over the allocation of raw materials would also make for greater efficiency. We must make as certain as possible that excess stocks of commodities urgently needed in one country are not allowed to pile up in another. A further need—and one which may be well on the way to satisfaction—is for a pool of shipping. Among them the United Nations control a vast merchant fleet, but the demands on it are enormous. We must try to streamline its operation so that the turn-around of ships in harbor is expedited and sailings in ballast are avoided whenever possible. Cooperation between the British Minister of Shipping, the United States Commission, and the shipping authorities of Norway, Holland, and other allies with extensive fleets cannot be too close. In fact, it might be wise to put all Allied vessels under one supreme control.

The first point of the Declaration of the United Nations is a pledge to pool material resources; the second is a promise to follow a common political policy, for without that the agreement not to make a separate peace

can hardly be fully effective. The declaration is clear enough on the subject of what we are fighting *against*, but on the question of what we are fighting *for* it has been content with the rather blurred outline provided by the Atlantic Charter. But even this may serve provisionally as a basis of foreign policies provided that the signatory nations agree on an interpretation which honors the spirit more than the text. Concretely this means a coordinated propaganda which appeals to the democratic elements in both neutral and conquered lands. It means a common policy in regard to such non-belligerent collaborators of the Axis as Vichy France and Franco Spain, and this policy must turn its back on appeasement. For the United Nations cannot remain united if some of them insist on dickerings with friends of the enemy. That is the way to breed fatal suspicions. One other point. We welcome the announcement of the State Department that it will receive statements of adherence to the declaration from "appropriate authorities which are not governments"; this gives the Free French, the Free Danes, and other democratic groups an opportunity to align themselves with the signatories. But we should welcome still more recognition of the Free French as a fighting associate in their own right. We should also like to suggest that the decision as to who is an "appropriate authority" ought not to be left to the State Department but should be the task of a representative committee of the United Nations. Otherwise we may find semi-recognition being conferred on such spurious democrats as Tibor de Eckhardt or even on hopeful royal exiles such as Otto of Austria or Carol of Rumania.

Roosevelt Must Act

IN OCTOBER, 1940, the nation's leading automobile manufacturers met in New York City and adopted a resolution pledging themselves to "subordinate work on automotive model changes to the necessities of the defense program and specifically to aviation procurement." They called on the president of the Automobile Manufacturers' Association to appoint a committee "to cooperate with all those in the automotive industry, the aviation industry, the tool-and-die makers, and automotive body shops in determining and listing all available facilities adaptable to airplane-parts production." The action was hailed at the time as a great contribution to the defense program, but little ever came of it. The industry went ahead on the second greatest production year in its history, consuming huge quantities of steel and other strategic materials while important armament work was slowed up for lack of the same supplies. Had the industry produced only 1,000 planes instead of the 5,000,000 cars it built last year, MacArthur might have been able to keep the Japanese out of the Philippines.

We believe that the results of the automobile-industry conference being held in Washington as we go to press will be equally disappointing if too much reliance is placed on the industry's promises. At the end of the first day's meeting the industry's representatives had given no indication of any willingness to pool their facilities or to convert them to defense on a large scale. On the contrary, automobile manufacturers on the eve of the conference had inserted a full-page advertisement in the country's leading newspapers accusing the "men who ran the sitdown strikes" of attempting to take over the automotive industry. At the conference itself they sat ominously silent, neither accepting nor disputing the proposals put forward by labor. The only industry representative to speak, C. E. Wilson, president of General Motors, indicated no change in the characteristic and unpatriotic greediness of automobile makers. He asked for further production of automobiles in February and for more liberal treatment of the industry on taxes and arms contracts. The conference adjourned without going on record for conversion or pooling, leaving behind it a ten-man labor-management advisory committee to palaver in Washington and in Detroit and report to Knudsen and Hillman as heads of the OPM. The committee has no power to force large-scale conversion of the automobile industry; and while Knudsen lacks the desire to compel conversion, Hillman lacks the personal force and fighting ability to put it over.

In our opinion the automobile industry has no intention of embarking on large-scale conversion of its facilities to war production unless it is forced to do so. Its strategy is to deceive the public about the results of this conference, to keep labor as far as possible from participation in management, and to go its own sweet way on the basis most profitable to it. This means obtaining as much truck work as it can, since trucks require the least change in automotive machinery, and leaving as much other armament work as possible to be done in new plane and tank plants now beginning to operate.

After more than a year and a half of Knudsen and Knudsenism the defense of our country is still being subordinated to the profits of the automobile industry. After all these months no survey has yet been made of the industry's capacity to move into war production. We think it is time the President acted. Under Section 9 of the Selective Service Act he has full power to place compulsory war orders in industry. Under this section he can establish a joint labor-government-management board to pool the automobile industry's facilities, to allocate orders on the most effective basis among these facilities, and to order the necessary conversion. We believe it is Mr. Roosevelt's duty to cut through the fog of false reports and industrial malingering and draft the automobile industry for war. The responsibility is his, and his failure to act will cost us heavily in lives lost and stra-

tegic positions abandoned for lack of the arms which the automobile industry could produce if properly organized.

Manila Falls

THE New Year started about as inauspiciously as possible for American arms. Within its first few hours Manila, capital of the Philippines, and Cavite, our great naval base in Manila Bay, were captured by the Japanese. With a lack of candor which seems inevitable in war time, the press has generally sought to minimize the loss of these two vital points. Much emphasis is being given to the fact that Manila Bay is largely useless to the invader as long as the American flag flies over the island fortress of Corregidor. This type of manufactured optimism is, to our way of thinking, most unfortunate. The truth, as most of the military experts will readily admit, is that the Philippines have been all but lost. The isolated garrison at Corregidor may hold out for days, or even weeks, but barring a substantial American counter-offensive it cannot hope to prolong its resistance indefinitely. Since no reinforcements whatever reached the Philippines during the first month of the war, it is hardly likely that our military authorities have prepared the way for an effective counterstroke at this stage.

Although it is true that the Philippine Islands are not in themselves of paramount strategic importance, their loss greatly increases the difficulty of defending Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. It also complicates the problem of striking effectively against the main Japanese bases. It is for these reasons that the Japanese threw all their resources into the attack on the islands. Having achieved their primary purpose, they will doubtless divert a large part of their forces to the even more important job of reducing Singapore. If Manila had been able to hold out for another month, the Allies might have been able to mobilize enough strength to insure the safety of Britain's great naval base. But the early collapse of our defenses in the Philippines raises a real doubt that Singapore—and with it the East Indies—can be held.

Responsibility for the defeat at Manila rests almost entirely with the army planners in Washington, who seem never really to have thought in terms of a joint Singapore-East Indies-Philippines defense. As an isolated outpost, Manila was helpless. As one of the essential elements in the joint defense of Anglo-Dutch-American possessions, it could have been saved. Even as it was, the Japanese had real difficulty overcoming the gallant little Philippine army under General MacArthur. Had MacArthur had effective naval and air support and some hope of reinforcements, he could have doubtless held Manila much longer. But the tiny Asiatic fleet under Admiral Hart was helpless against the superior Japanese, and air support was almost non-existent.

What was needed long ago, of course, was a program of unified strategy in the Far East such as now seems to be evolving with the appointment of General Wavell to the Supreme Allied Command. Several weeks before the attack on Pearl Harbor we were given to believe that such a plan for joint defense had been worked out. It now appears that if any plan existed, it was of a most rudimentary type. Nothing that has happened in the past month would suggest that plans had been laid for moving the American battle fleet to Singapore or the Australian bases, or that a program had been worked out for rushing American air and ground reinforcements from Hawaii to threatened points in the Pacific. Nor do preparations seem to have been made for moving Indian or Australian forces to aid the Philippine defense.

Although seriously belated, the working out of a program of unified strategy as a result of the Washington conference between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt should prove of inestimable value. There is no sector of the war where a Supreme Command is more essential than in the Pacific. Without it, the Americans and British, and to a lesser extent the Dutch and Chinese, have tended to conduct their defenses as if they were fighting alone. It is now possible to think in terms of the larger strategic opportunities presented through a pooling of men and resources. It is only unfortunate that this should have come after the loss of Hongkong, Manila, Guam, Wake, northern Borneo, and northern Malaya—most of which will have to be retaken before offensive operations against Japan can begin.

Production Politics

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, January 4

WHAT does the President really think? I pass on two stories, from equally reliable sources.

The first is that after an all-night session with Beaverbrook the President told a Cabinet meeting that he was ashamed of America's production effort. The second is that at the first SPAB meeting after Pearl Harbor the President slapped Knudsen on the knee and said, "Bill, I want you to know that I think you have done a wonderful job, but we've got to do even better now." The first story comes from a source which believes a drastic shake-up of defense is impending, the second from a source which thinks Mr. Roosevelt is still a long way from recognizing how badly this country has been betrayed by its big business men.

The Problem of the Vice-President. One of the problems in reorganizing the defense effort is how to "save face"—so Oriental are we becoming—for the Vice-President. Mr. Wallace now heads both the SPAB and the Economic Warfare Board, and if he were energetic enough he could, indeed, be an assistant President, as the publicity releases after the election said he would be. Unfortunately the Vice-President's courage has never been the equal of his vision. As Secretary of Agriculture he did many good things but in a showdown knuckled under to the packers and the milk trust and the big agricultural interests. Neither at SPAB nor in Economic Warfare has he yet shown capacity for the kind of leadership needed. Generally speaking, big business still dominates the former and the State Department the latter. Some progress has been made by both agencies, but not enough to matter. If Wallace were a fighter, he

might have used these two agencies in a way that would have reformed both the production effort and our foreign policy.

One can hardly "fire" the Vice-President, and it is difficult to promote some ordinary mortal over his head. I have heard that Judge Samuel M. Rosenman was warned of these complications when he drew the blueprints for the SPAB. It is now hoped that the creation of an Inter-Allied Council will offer a way out, and that the executive secretary of this council can in effect become the one-man boss of the American war-production effort, exercising control over both the mobilization of industry and economic warfare. This is the job for which a great undercover struggle is being waged, led by Tom Corcoran on one side and Harry Hopkins on the other. What will the President do about all this? One of his favorite devices, when beset with contending factions, is to make a move that can be made to appear a victory for either side. In such cases the action taken by the President may, indeed, become a victory for either. For, in effect, while appearing to resolve a conflict the President will merely have transferred it to a new plane.

"Undermining" Jesse Jones Again. A good example is the President's appointment of Jesse Jones to the SPAB, which has felt that Jones was being much too slow in expanding production of basic materials. This new move may subordinate Jones to the SPAB or it may subordinate the board to Jones. The latter is the more likely, for three reasons. None of the liberals on the SPAB, including Donald Nelson, have shown any real fighting power. Jones is a stronger character than any man on the board except Knudsen, and they are

two of a kind and will work together. While Jones was given a place on the SPAB, the board was given no power over the RFC or its subsidiary Defense Plant Corporation. Thus the SPAB has no authority to tell Jones what to do about plant expansion. This appointment to the SPAB is the latest of a series of attempts to "undermine" Jones's power by extending it.

Can the SPAB Succeed Where F. D. R. Fails? The President himself seems unable to control Jones. The story of the Puget Sound Power and Light negotiations is typical. In August, 1940, Emil Schram, then head of the RFC, promised to lend Washington public-power authorities the money they needed to buy out the Puget Sound Company. The promise was made in writing, but after Schram left the RFC Jones refused to keep the promise. The President himself intervened last July and named Jones, Ickes, and Chairman Eicher of the SEC a special committee to work out all details of the acquisition. Jones is still giving the public-power people from Washington a run-around. The state of Washington, which produces lumber, metals, aircraft, ships, and chemicals for defense, now has more than a billion dollars in contracts. The territory served by the Puget Sound Company is already suffering from a power shortage, and defense orders are expected to double the load within the next year. The company is too heavily overcapitalized to expand its facilities. Important areas of arms output are endangered, but the delay continues though the President has personally heard the story from

visiting Washington delegations and has shown his sympathy with them.

"Marie Antoinette" Jones. Until the President musters the will to get rid of Jones, Knudsen, and others like them, we shall not hit our production stride, and we shall have a succession of Pearl Harbors and Manilas. In this connection I want to tell a story I heard yesterday about Jones. I know the source well and I know where he got it, and I am sure that it is literally, as well as symbolically, true. I think the story will some day rank with Marie Antoinette's "Let them eat cake." It has to do with the disastrous fire which destroyed 20,000 tons of rubber recently at the Firestone plant in Fall River, Massachusetts. Everybody knows by now that while the Japanese are well supplied—thanks to Hull and appeasement—with American oil and scrap, we are very poorly supplied with Malay and Dutch East Indian tin and rubber. For this we have to thank Jesse Jones. A subordinate came to Jones wringing his hands over the 20,000 tons of rubber lost in the fire. Jones couldn't understand why this man was so upset. "The rubber," Jones said, "was fully insured."

Footnote. Chairman Edward J. Flynn of the Democratic National Committee has just designated Oscar R. Ewing, assistant chairman, to take charge "of the party organization's activities in furtherance of the national defense program." Ewing is counsel and Washington lobbyist for the Aluminum Company of America.

Balance Sheet of the War

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

AS WE enter a new year, the third year of World War II, it might be well to pause and consider our failures and successes, our position and its possibilities. The outstanding feature of the present war up to the point of active American naval aid in the summer of 1941 was the fact that it had gone overwhelmingly in favor of the Axis. Brilliant victories on the continent of Europe had left Hitler master of vast resources of labor and materials. British successes at the expense of the Italians were secondary, and the only real accomplishment of the Allies was the R. A. F.'s defeat of the Luftwaffe in its attack on England preliminary to an intended invasion. The victory saved Great Britain but did not bring the defeat of Hitler any nearer.

In the spring of 1941 Germany launched an attack on the Balkans for the purpose of getting raw materials and destroying the British position in the Near East. The extremely well-managed campaign in Yugoslavia and

Greece and against Crete proved that bravery of opponents and difficulty of terrain could not stop the German army. The British suffered large losses, and their position was further compromised when Rommel pushed the weakened North African forces back into Egypt. Even Britain's hitherto loyal ally, Turkey, betrayed Axis leanings.

When the final history of the present war is written, the failure of Hitler to follow up his victories in Europe by an attack through Turkey against Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and India will doubtless prove one of his greatest blunders. The greatly weakened British were then in no condition to resist successfully. But after preliminary gestures in Iraq and Iran which were promptly countered by the British and Russians, Hitler turned toward Russia, and the British were given valuable months for the reorganization and reinforcement of their entire position in the Near East. The great bulk of American equip-

ment went there rather than to England. In the meantime attempts by the Axis to reinforce Libya, necessarily a secondary operation, led to a series of defeats accompanied with heavy losses administered by the British Mediterranean fleet.

Continued Allied victories on this front seem likely. However, their limited significance must be kept in mind. Save as a base for attack, Libya is quite worthless to the Axis. The British have successfully maintained a position which is of great importance to themselves but which, aside from prestige, means little to Germany. However, Hitler is sensitive to loss of prestige, and if he does not soon attempt to retrieve the Libyan campaign, possibly through the use of Tunis, it will probably be because he is unable to do so.

In early 1941 by far the most important front was in the North Atlantic. Sinkings by submarines and planes rose to such high levels—with ship losses reaching a figure a third of a million tons greater than replacements—that Britain was threatened with starvation in late 1941 or 1942.

President Roosevelt, however, proved to be keenly alert to England's danger. By midsummer the United States, at the cost of seriously reducing its strength in the Pacific, had transferred enough ships to provide adequate escort for convoys. Many merchant ships were handed over, and the earlier entirely inadequate American shipbuilding program was greatly augmented. The wolf packs continue to operate, but they are claiming fewer victims. Replacements are now at least even with losses and before the end of 1942 should go markedly ahead. The turning of German energies to the east, coincident with American aid, has enormously diminished the submarine's chance of success.

But this triumph in the North Atlantic cannot alone defeat Germany; it merely prevents it from giving the British Empire a knockout blow. It remained for Hitler himself to open a front against an opponent whose strength on land may ultimately bring about Germany's downfall. Aside from the counterfeit crusade against communism, the German objectives in the war against Russia have been defined as (1) destruction of the Red Army as an effective force, (2) acquisition of sufficient raw materials to make Germany blockade proof. Neither objective has been attained. Instead, after vast but largely profitless gains on land, the German army itself is being defeated by the powerful Red Army, aided by the enormous distances and by the Arctic cold, which in early January has not yet reached its greatest intensity. The really large gains of industrially valuable territory have been rendered temporarily worthless; their exploitation will require time and uninterrupted effort, and neither of these seems likely to be granted to the Germans by the Red Army, which instead promises to regain a large share of the hard-won German conquests

of 1941. Since the Russian campaign has necessitated huge expenditures of those very raw materials whose lack caused Hitler to attack Russia, it is entirely reasonable to assume that the Germans are now beginning to experience critical shortages of materials. Of the European theaters of war, the Russian is by all odds the most important.

On the home fronts the greatest gains of 1941 have accrued to the Allies. Bombings of cities have proved unprofitable. In territories conquered by the Axis as well as in Italy cooperation with Germany has been reduced to the minimum as Russian successes have given a promise of ultimate deliverance. Internal differences of long standing have recently been aggravated in Germany, but it is doubtful that they will interfere seriously with the prosecution of the war.

By far the greatest gain on the home front has been registered in our own country. With the outbreak of war the United States experienced the greatest upsurge of war-time unity in our history. Difficult labor troubles, inadequate planning to achieve success, the slogans of "defense" and "aid short of war," and even worse military rubbish were quickly dumped overboard. For the first time since September, 1939, the nation faced facts and tossed aside wishful thinking.

Early defeats in a war with Japan were made inevitable by geography. The loss of Hongkong, Guam, and other points does not constitute ground for valid criticism of the military services. But there are other causes for dissatisfaction. The whole United States was far too confident of the outcome of a war with Japan, and it is obvious that the services shared this feeling to a point of being far too complacent. Despite preliminary warnings by Secretary Hull, they did not take those precautions which would have made a surprise at Pearl Harbor militarily impossible. A serious error of administration was the failure to provide sufficient air power in the Philippines to make such projects as the landing at Lingayen Gulf enormously costly. A further fault of the American public is the tendency to assume that in the Far East time at least is on the side of the Allies. If Japanese aggression is sufficiently successful and Japan is able to consolidate its gains, it will possess most of the raw materials it now lacks, and the economic weapon will lose most of its force.

In short, 1941 has been the first year of the war not dominated completely by the Axis. In the Near East and at sea Great Britain with our aid has held its own but has not regained lost ground. America has shaken off the shackles of "defense" for a tremendous all-out effort; beyond that, our greatest hope lies in Russian resistance. With Hitler distracted for another year, ships can be safely transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific and time will be gained for the organization of an expeditionary force.

Hitler's Restless Reich

BY HEINZ POL

THE removal of General von Brauchitsch and a number of other high officers in the German army, the taking over of the Supreme Command by Hitler personally and his bombastic and ridiculous proclamation accompanying that action, Goebbels's call for warm clothing for the soldiers fighting in Russia—all point to more than a German military defeat on the eastern front; they substantiate reports of a critical situation within the borders of the Reich. This situation has been latent for months, but it came to a head only with the realization on the part of several groups extremely important to the Nazi regime that at best the war could not be won within a period of time even approximating what Hitler had promised. When it became apparent late in the fall that the Russian campaign was lost, the crisis entered an acute phase which was still further intensified by the declaration of war against the United States.

What is the nature of this crisis and what are the groups involved? First, a steadily growing circle of important German industrialists and business men has seriously begun to ponder the possibility of liquidating the Nazi Party, and even Hitler, in order to obtain a compromise peace. They are prepared to make territorial and political concessions in return for substantial freedom of action to German industry and commerce in Europe. Second, the Russian campaign was undertaken against the better judgment of a number of officers associated with the General Staff, and thus an opposition trend has developed even among the brass hats. At present it is confined to a small group, but that group is extraordinarily powerful. It is much more radical in its conclusions than the industrial group, and takes an even more pessimistic view of the chances for German victory. Since the army will not act on its own, the leaders of the military opposition group have approached the leaders of the industrial opposition group with the purpose of discovering whether there are men ready to take over the government if the Nazi regime is overthrown. Naturally they would have to be to the taste of the army and of the conservative, non-Nazi elements of the population. Also, to negotiate a peace successfully, they would have to be acceptable to Britain and the United States.

There are cogent reasons why such plans are being mooted. German industry is in the middle of a process of consolidation. In recent months crucial industries in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Danubian and Balkan countries have been combined into

great iron, coal, steel, and dye trusts, under German corporate control. Thus the promised harvest from the seed Hitler has sown is slowly being garnered. German industry in the Ruhr and Saar regions has merged with French and Belgian heavy industry. The I. G. Farbenindustrie, the famous German dye trust, is now associated with the Kuhlmann Works in France. The German potash industry has acquired the last remaining non-German potash deposits in Europe, those in Poland and Alsace-Lorraine, thus assuring an air-tight monopoly. The firm of Wolff is reorganizing Polish industry; and the recently formed French Trans-African Company, financed by the Deutsche Bank, bids fair to assume economic control of the French colonial empire. An ever-growing number of German industrialists and bankers are asking whether these fertile developments are to be wrecked by a protraction of the war. As long as the war continues, the resources of occupied territories cannot be properly exploited. That was proved in the First World War, and the situation is no different today, even though much more territory has been occupied. In a word, the time has come to cash in the chips.

But can the war be ended with Hitler in the saddle, or must he be removed? That is the great problem facing the industrialists in the opposition camp. One group, composed chiefly of men whose interests are concentrated in France and the Balkans, believes that a new Europe can be organized with Hitler at its head. This would require the complete destruction of Soviet Russia, a clean sweep in Europe, and a compromise peace with Britain—a peace that would be very close to a dictated peace. A second group, led by men whose interests far transcend Europe, takes a much more pessimistic view of Germany's economic situation and regards anything resembling peace as out of the question so long as the Hitler regime is in power. This is the more active group. It works with people who officially represent the Nazi regime even though they are not party members, and its reasoning runs along the following lines: The only obstacle to the conclusion of peace is Hitler; the war aims of Churchill, Roosevelt, and all the other enemies of Germany start with the removal of the Nazis; quite apart from the question of whether Germany can continue to wage war without Hitler, it is clear that the moment Hitler is displaced Germany's enemies will lose all their moral reasons for continuing the war. The group believes that those enemies would become reconciled to any other government in Germany.

It is reported that the leaders of this group include numerous Catholic industrialists in the Rhineland (especially the firm of Klöckner), as well as representatives of the dye trust and, more recently, of the Krupp Works. Mr. Iselin, the dye trust's Swiss dummy who was forced to cool his heels in Lisbon from October to December, 1940, apparently unable to continue his trip to New York, had not only been charged with the task of straightening out certain matters in connection with the American dye trust, but was supposed to put out peace feelers on behalf of certain industrialists—indeed, to make certain offers. In Lisbon Iselin seemed to be certain that war between Germany and the United States was only a remote possibility, though he endeavored to explain that "something" had to be done immediately to keep Hitler from committing another act of insanity. In certain German industrial circles the act of insanity committed since then has undoubtedly created a profound shock. It must at the same time have substantially strengthened opposition sentiment.

The phalanx of dissatisfied industry has found strong support in recent months in the German Ministry of Economics. Dr. Clodius, who has concluded nearly all of Germany's foreign commercial treaties, is one of the white hopes of the "Second Front" now in the process of formation behind the back of Adolf Hitler. Clodius, a man of great energy, is under the jurisdiction of the Economics Division of the German Foreign Office rather than directly under the Ministry of Economics. He is, moreover, a diplomat rather than an economic expert, even though his diplomatic manners are somewhat crude. When his mask of courtesy fails to meet with instant success, he gets tough, and his outbursts of fury during the negotiations in Vienna, Bucharest, and Ankara have become famous. He has never been a Nazi but is a cold opportunist who has always been able to jump off the train in time.

Another whose name must be mentioned is Dr. Helmut Wohlthat, an outspoken non-Nazi who has managed to advance his career in the industrial bureaucracy of the Third Reich with amazing speed. After the First World War Wohlthat spent many years in the United States, where he was active in the oil industry, among other things, and often visited Mexico. Today he is the Third Reich's great oil expert, the founder of the Continental Oil Company. Related to Schacht by marriage, he is Schacht's confidant as well as disciple. As for Schacht himself, officially his activities are circumscribed, but he continues to be very busy behind the scenes—not entirely along orthodox Nazi lines. Wohlthat works closely with representatives of the General Staff in the Ministry of Economics, and these generals, headed by Thomas, form the core of the dissatisfied brass hats. Their first aim, already achieved to a surprising degree, was to free industry from party interference.

The circle around Wohlthat is extremely powerful and has at its disposal numerous underground channels that lead abroad. For some months these channels have been used to establish contact with circles that favor a compromise peace, to be concluded once Hitler has been removed. But Hitler's removal, to say nothing of breaking the Nazi Party's influence, is impossible without direct intervention by the army. No one knows this better than Hitler himself. Up to the outbreak of the war Hitler's relations with the army were governed by a number of compromises which gave him the chance to place party tools in key positions. His success—from the Rhineland occupation to the invasion of Crete—so strengthened his position that even none too friendly army circles had to keep quiet. But in the Russian campaign Hitler and his *Blitzkrieg* strategists miscalculated, and the first who had to go was the Nazi Brauchitsch. There are indications that Brauchitsch disappeared because the generals who had objected to the Russian campaign from the outset—Thomas, chief of the Economic General Staff, and Halder, chief of the General Staff—were clamoring for his head. Generals von Bock, von Rundstedt, Ritter von Leeb, and Guderian, all of whom are now reported to have been discharged, are officers who not only enthusiastically promoted Hitler's *Blitzkrieg* strategy but have records as party members that antedate 1933. If it turns out that Halder too has been shelved, it is likely that this eminently capable General Staff officer, who loathes the Führer and is hated by him in return, has withdrawn voluntarily. It is known that he offered his resignation at the beginning of the Russian campaign and that it was not accepted.

Among the more important generals still retaining Hitler's confidence because of their political attitude is Keitel, chief of the High Command. Keitel is not a friend of the Nazi Party, but he still regards Hitler's personal prestige as great enough to be equal to any situation. In recent months quiet has descended on the circle around fashionable General von Reichenau, who in 1938 unsuccessfully attempted to Nazify the army. Generals Jodl and Varlimont, of Hitler's personal staff, are reported to be more expert as toadies than as strategists.

Hitler's assumption of the Supreme Command may have been an emergency solution to which he was forced to resort because there was no one with brains on the General Staff willing to assume further responsibility. If Guderian's last general order as published by the Russians is authentic ("Maintain iron discipline. Everyone must remain in his unit"), it shows clearly that the morale of the troops is at zero level, and that the generals are face to face with the specter of 1918.

But let us beware of miscalculations: there has been no revolt of the generals. What does exist is a crisis that becomes accentuated from day to day. On the one hand

this crisis forces Hitler to make increasingly rash decisions both at home and on the battlefield; on the other it gives the conservative officers a chance to strengthen their influence, especially over and against the party.

The handling of the hostage problem in France is a good example of this continued clash. Hitler's decree of October, 1940, suspending the mass shootings of hostages in France was the result of an outright ultimatum by the General Staff. A highly personal role has been played in this particular tug-of-war by General Otto von Stülpnagel, commander of the German occupation troops in France. As a major in the First World War he had the task in northern France of arresting hostages and ordering them shot, as well as of sending many Frenchmen as labor slaves to Germany. After the war the French pilloried him as a "war criminal" and demanded his extradition. He in turn created a "Commission of Inquiry" which proved that not he but the Allies had committed atrocities. From that time on Stülpnagel developed an anti-French complex, and he swore that in the Second World War he would actually do what he claimed the Germans had falsely been accused of in the First World War. The future treatment of the hostage problem, that is, whether the wishes of the Gestapo or the army prevail—will be a good indication of the strength or weakness of the "Second Front."

On the battlefield the army has scored a partial victory over the party. The armed force of the S. S., which has always been the backbone of the party, numbers some 400,000 to 500,000 men, equipped with the best and most modern weapons and including Panzer divisions

and bombing squadrons. This force has been decimated daily on the Russian front. One version has it that it was Hitler himself who, expecting swift victory on the eastern front, ordered large-scale participation by the S. S. In another version it was the General Staff that threw the S. S. into the front line—to fill gaps and perhaps for other reasons. Whatever the reason may be, the Elite Guards are being bled white.

In addition to the opposition from business and army circles, the church too has come to the fore again. Catholic bishops, for example, have bitterly complained against certain measures taken by the Gestapo and other party organizations. Protestant bishops act in concert with their Catholic fellows. Dr. Wurm, Bishop of Württemberg, has openly attacked the Nazi system and spoken of a shattered home front, and the few chaplains admitted to the front have been known to hint more or less openly to the soldiers that the Nazis can never win, let alone attain an acceptable peace. In this sphere of opposition the "Second Front" reaches the people themselves. Many industrialists, generals, and even high clergymen are haunted by the fear that each passing month of the war will serve to arouse the generally stolid masses. They would prefer to liquidate the Nazi system "from above," to avoid both military defeat and the threat of revolution. But how much time is left? That is the decisive question. Can Hitler achieve during the coming year what he failed to achieve in 1941? If not, can the "Second Front" close the gap by means of a "negotiated peace without the Nazis" before the inevitable collapse?

Don't Plan for Collapse

BY HAROLD STRAUSS

II. Program for a Peace Economy

SECOND only to military victory as a major problem of American society is the transformation of full war production to full peace production when the struggle is over. If we can put our finger on the force that is now making our gigantic industrial mechanism tick, if we can discover the true initiative, the propulsive agent behind our armament drive, we might be able to housebreak this force to the uses of peace. The impetus toward industrial expansion is not now coming from within business; it comes from an aroused community. Something is happening now which is striking the shackles of financial control from production. We are making certain kinds of goods now regardless of their marketability and regardless of profit. It happens that they

are war goods; they might just as well be peace goods.

The theorists of the thirties, wrestling with the problems of the Long Depression, almost always came face to face with the question of new investment. Every student predicted that a resumption of new investment in adequate volume would banish the depression, for it had been amply shown that full employment and full production are dependent upon the rate of new investment, at least in a society in which there exists an irresistible inclination to save. The great problem then became: how was new investment to be initiated?

Traditionally, business was supposed to initiate new investment automatically, in response to the lure of profits. But in the middle thirties the lure was there—to no avail. Although profits were large, there was no substantial new investment, no real dent in the number

of unemployed. The business man attributed this to lack of confidence in the New Deal, which was equivalent to admitting that there were factors other than profits, such as his power and prestige in the community, which controlled the business man's actions. Slowly everyone began to see that new investment was only to a slight degree an automatic economic response. Business men became quite mystical on the subject. They said, kick out the New Deal and we will give you new investment. Whereupon the Temporary National Economic Committee, in one of its most useful projects, undertook to bring the discussion back to the realm of economics. TNEC Monograph Number Twelve, "Prices, Profits, and New Investment," shows exhaustively and conclusively that in general new investment is much more responsive to the ratio of capacity to current output, and to technological advances, than to the rate of profit or business "confidence." This simply means that business will usually fill orders, and that it will use the best available processes. It will do this regardless of its frame of mind, for the plea of "no confidence" is a political smoke screen.

The TNEC analysis is shrewd enough in terms of academic economics, but it falls short of the mark in two respects. It is strictly quantitative; and it is merely descriptive of what happens in a society that allows itself to succumb to cyclical depressions. For continuous new investment restricted to going industries tends to raise capacity in relation to output. And technological advances are necessarily irregular and uncontrollable. That is why depressions have invariably succeeded periods of new investment. Therefore, even if we can attain a rapid rate of new investment after the war in order to transform war industries into peace industries, there nevertheless remains the prospect of subsequent collapse; that is, even if there is a boom immediately after the end of the war, the inevitable outstripping of market demand by new productive capacity in going industries will subsequently precipitate a collapse.

So runs the argument of even the most optimistic. Fortunately, however, the nature of "demand" is not adequately apprehended by economists who take this purely mechanistic approach. They fail at this point because they are economists, and not politicians or moralists; they take no note of the possibility of the continuous mobilization of demand by means that have not hitherto played a part in the economic structure except during time of war. They simply make an unimaginative audit of past experience. This accounting approach is trustworthy only in a static economy. It is not likely that it will be useful in the face of the vast change now taking place in our economic structure—the huge expansion in its physical base. The accountants say we shall be poorer after the war; but of course in terms of our ability to produce the things men need, we shall be much richer.

"LEAKAGE": THE FUTILITY OF RELIEF SPENDING

But will this new plant be "excess capacity," or can it be put to fairly continuous use? There are some who say that it can if we enlarge the government spending program of the thirties, if we simply subsidize consumption on a vaster scale. They are wrong. There is an essential qualitative difference between relief spending and war spending. A government deficit in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1941, of 5.1 billion dollars has so stimulated the economy that we are in fear of an inflation based on real shortages; but a 1936-37 government deficit of not so very much less—4.6 billions—resulted only in piddling inventory speculation and early collapse.

The difference between war spending and relief spending brings us close to the central economic problem of our century. Relief spending left the economy flaccid, while war spending has galvanized it. The difference is that the war boom has induced investment, while relief expenditures simply put money into the hands of consumers who purchased goods for the production of which there was ample plant. Relief kept people from starving, but it did not increase our real income sufficiently because of what is now referred to as leakage. When money is put directly into the hands of consumers and they spend the entire amount, as would be the case with relief funds, only about two-thirds of it passes on from the vendors of consumers' goods to a new set of potential consumers in the form of wages and material-purchases. The other third is accumulated in the form of profits, depreciation and other reserves, and debt retirement. These are in effect savings; and to these savings by business must be added the savings of individuals. If we could be certain that these savings would find an outlet in real investment, they need not be deplored. But we know that we cannot count on their finding such an outlet. When they do not, savings are leakages. And the leakages persist in every round of expenditure by consumers, until ultimately the entire amount of money that has been paid out as relief by the government has been retired to idleness.

In the arms program not only does the government invest directly in new capacity and induce private investment in new capacity, but beyond that these investments are in themselves investment-inducing. That is, the new plants put up by or on behalf of the government are not only real assets capable of increasing our real income; but they induce investment on the part of the suppliers of the new plants, and on the part of the suppliers of the suppliers. To put it simply, the demand is for a kind of goods for which there are inadequate productive facilities. A single investment in a new aviation plant may induce expansion of steel mills, metallurgical industries, power plants, and much else. This is statistically confirmed by the huge current expansion in commercial

loans, and by the employment of large, hitherto idle, cash balances by industry.

Such a situation requires a new interpretation of economic demand. The use of the word demand by classical economists was static, and referred to the actual possibilities of selling anything at a given moment. It was synonymous with marketability. Thus the Ricardian analysis assumed that consumption is always equal to output, and made allowances for neither expansion nor contraction of the whole economy. Modern economists have improved upon Ricardo by concerning themselves with changes in the volume of production originating within the economic structure. But a truly progressive analysis of demand will go beyond the mechanics of the market-place and put great stress, not only on cyclical change, but also upon those changes imposed on the economic system from without, by mobilized demand. The most striking of such changes have hitherto been imposed by war. The classical economists always had a lot of trouble with war, because they were trained to think of demand as something automatic. The progressive economist thinks of demand as something human, something originating within the community, something that can be planned.

WE CAN AFFORD "WASTE"

Demand is obviously present now—the demand for arms; but one thing stands in the way of an objective perception of its economic function. That one thing is humanitarian sentimentality. The view is widespread that arms production is pure waste. In an economic sense that view is wrong. The fact that munitions are destined to go up in smoke has no more economic significance than the "waste" of gasoline spent for joy-riding or the "waste" of fabrics lavished on women's silly hats, which, even if they do not, should likewise go up in smoke. Nor does the fact that bombs are used to kill people alter this proposition. Our dislike for the way a particular article is used does not entitle us to deny that it is consumed. Any such denial would dismiss all activity not productive of sheer animal necessities as waste. It is the triumph of our technology that we can afford "waste" of this kind. In fact, the fundamental pattern of our lives, of our industrial society, of the way we live together in cities and work in factories is the result of our determination to afford just such "waste."

The error that stigmatizes battleships as unproductive is not a new one. There was a time when the Physiocrats denounced *all manufacture* as waste, and insisted that manufacturers and their employees were parasites preying upon the true producers—the agriculturists. Adam Smith exploded this fallacy by showing that agriculture enriched itself when it became able to support manufacture by its surpluses. The enrichment was not the *money* it obtained by selling its produce but the goods it

obtained in exchange. Adam Smith in turn was unable to see the whole picture. His peculiar materialism, as Alvin H. Hansen points out, forced him to argue that only those who produce material goods were productive, thus excluding "churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters of all kinds, players, buffoons, musicians, opera singers, opera dancers, etc." This of course was pure prejudice, for we can now see that any activity that satisfies human wants is productive. All such activities cannot at once be "economized" or drawn within the economic system; but economic progress consists essentially in the ability of existing factors of production to accumulate surpluses by greater efficiency and by technological advance, so that there may be a continuous withdrawal of factors of production from present activities, and a devotion of these factors to new activities. Surpluses are the real assets of civilization. In a transition period, surpluses reflect themselves in unemployment. This simply means that hitherto we have been intolerably slow in recognizing our assets and in using them. We sin constantly, as Smith sinned in his time, when we fail to see that the work of his list of non-material producers not only satisfies human wants but can also be "afforded" by industry and agriculture as soon as these are able to produce a surplus.

Adam Smith's error has been largely rectified. But some who see that he was wrong in respect to buffoons and men of letters repeat his mistake in respect to government expenditures. They assert that public investment in parks, roads, schools, and hospitals is unproductive, while private expenditures are generally productive. But this view will not withstand careful analysis, for it is only the device of payment that differs. We pay for a pleasure car directly and individually, but we pay for the roads on which we drive that car indirectly and collectively, through taxation. The distinction has some moral significance, because there is an element of compulsion in taxation, but it has only slight economic significance. It is clear that a well-built road performs a service which we enjoy and for which one way or another we must pay.

Clearly, physical security against an armed enemy is a human want as genuine as the desire for fluff and feathers. This want is served by tanks and warplanes and battleships. We may deplore on moral grounds that our productivity must now be channeled toward the manufacture of instruments of death; but on economic grounds we should rejoice that we are impressively able to afford the undertaking. We as a community, by *extra-economic processes*, have conceived the need for arms. We have imposed this new demand upon the productive plant of the nation. Once we have understood the nature of this conceptual act, or, if you will, of this imaginative act, we can see how we might adapt it to the purposes of peace. We can see that the core of the job is the continuous formulation of new demands for necessary, useful,

or enjoyable products, and the deliberate imposition of these demands upon the productive plant of the nation.

Some may fear that this process can loose such a flood of goods that man will drown in it. In answer it is necessary only to say that the formula does not deal only with material things; it envisions the production of non-material services, and of the things of the mind and the spirit. The process cannot be too rapid in any case, since there is available at any one time only a finite surplus of current production. The rate at which new demands are formulated must clearly be governed by the availability of man-power, materials, and machinery. But the fact that at this point in our argument we must seek a limit to new demand is proof that, in the words of Henderson, "the philosophy that we can never achieve and maintain something approaching full employment . . . is false."

I shall not discuss here the kinds of new demand that can be formulated after the war. Any forward-looking, imaginative person can supply a list. The making of lists of this kind has long been a progressive pastime. The important matter is not the kind of goods that are in question, but the precise fashion in which new demand can be imposed upon the economic system.

FORCED PRODUCTION: A PEACE-TIME PROGRAM

Let us now suppose that the need for arms abates, so that we come face to face with the much-heralded post-war collapse. In terms of the marketability of goods, to content ourselves for the moment with so repugnant a criterion, there quite clearly will be some impairment of the economy. There will be a simultaneous release of munitions workers from employment and conscripts from the army—and neither will have a prospect of reemployment in a private industry confessedly devoid of the intention of new expansion, and already making plans for the drastic reduction of output. But if progressives come to understand the real nature of surpluses and how they enable society to afford new undertakings, post-war disemployment should be welcomed rather than deplored. For available (unemployed) man-power and surpluses are but two aspects of the same phenomenon, and surpluses are an asset. Our responsibility, of course, is to use this asset as rapidly, as efficiently, and as constructively as possible.

There is a likelihood that the war effort will have materially reduced consumption for a time. There may then be a sudden increase in the demand for consumers' goods, notwithstanding widespread unemployment. But an increased production of consumers' goods alone, as we learned in 1937, is not sufficient to float our economy, particularly if the lid is removed from prices. When peace comes, we shall be able to make automobiles and refrigerators and radios without much new investment. The output of consumers' goods can be vastly expanded without requiring new factors of production. The regular

depreciation of machinery and its replacement by machinery that is more efficient are alone sufficient to expand the output of consumers' goods steadily—without new investment, and therefore without absorbing the newly unemployed. It must be remembered that the cost of replacing worn-out machinery is not new investment, for depreciation charges are a part of current operating costs. The only hope of avoiding a situation similar to the unpleasant one of 1936-37, when there was a high volume of output of consumers' goods concurrently with widespread unemployment, lies in a systematic, balanced, and coordinated expansion of the entire economic system: that is, in the demand terminology which I have stressed, the only hope lies in the imposition of new demands by extra-economic processes.

We can do this with the same techniques we use to obtain war production. We can authorize government agencies to prompt expansion; and if prompting fails, to command expansion; and if commanding fails, to undertake expansion directly. (By prompting I mean the use of such devices as tax remission and subsidy. Some of these devices, such as the five-year amortization of new defense plants and the Defense Plant Corporation loans, are being used now to obtain war production. In my last article I denounced them as bribes to business. They are bribes because they are secret. But certainly if they are used in an open and honest fashion for the constructive purposes of peace, they can be more readily accepted as a useful mechanism.) The sequence of the three methods, prompting, commanding, undertaking, is important, and offers a concept now much more useful than the old concepts of socialism and capitalism and their various modifications of state socialism and state capitalism. In the mixed economies of Great Britain and the United States there are some fields in which production is governed by marketability and private initiative, some in which production is prompted, a few in which it is commanded, and one or two in which it is undertaken directly by the government. In Germany the first form has practically vanished, and production is largely prompted or commanded. In the Soviet Union it is, of course, undertaken directly. It seems clear that the form adopted should be chosen not for ideological but rather for pragmatic reasons, in accordance with the availability of surplus man-power and the workability of the more traditional methods.

This view rests upon one cardinal principle, clearly demonstrated by the arms effort: the people, at any time, are able to conceive new demands, and to impose them on the economic system. More specifically, the people, acting collectively, can open up many new channels of production not of themselves inviting to private capital. Where the *sine qua non* is not profit but rather the satisfaction of human wants by an increased flow of useful or enjoyable goods and services, there are staggering

possibilities for the organization of production. The forms of organization are many and flexible: we have had experience with public agencies such as the TVA; with semi-public agencies, such as the Port of New York Authority; with private organizations operating under government subsidy, such as the merchant marine and air lines. The significant thing is not whether an agency is public or private; the significant thing is that the initiative that brought the agency into being has passed from private hands to the government, which is to say, to the people acting collectively.

This is a production program. It has nothing to do with the spending program of the thirties, with their confusions, their fumbblings, their social tensions, and, above all, their continued unemployment. Unemployment is a storm signal, the sign that we must initiate new enterprises. The government's efforts must be directed toward keeping the workers in the factories and the farmers in the fields, and toward increasing our capacity to produce *new* types of goods and services. It must charge itself with the responsibility of imposing new demands upon the economic system. This requires a program of government investment, or a program of investment induction, or, better still, a combination of the two.

It is not possible to expect conservatives to support a program such as has been outlined here. They will rely on institutional inertia to bobble back into the groove of scarcity, of limited production, of inequitable fluctuations in prices, of idle men, money, and machines. That means an enormous deflation, falling commodity prices, and an increase in the value of the dollar. That in turn means that those with an accumulation of dollars will be able to increase the concentration of ownership of the means of production, while those dependent upon the velocity of the turnover of dollars, chiefly labor and small independent enterprisers, will be in for a period of suffering that will make 1932 look like a honeymoon.

If democracy means anything, it means that the people of America can and will find a way to avoid such a collapse. The meek acceptance of the inevitability of collapse is erroneous and stupid. More than that, it is immoral. Our way of life is largely governed by our disposal for factory production and bulk distribution. Unless we achieve the objectives of production and distribution with reasonable success, we should dispose ourselves differently. Not to do so is, in Darwinian terms, the fundamental immorality. It may, of course, be merely an American mannerism to talk of the "inevitability" of post-war collapse, and then to set about avoiding it with ingenuity, determination, and a good chance of success. But it is about time that ingenuity and determination be summoned; success will take care of itself.

[The first of Mr. Strauss's two articles on the expected post-war collapse was published last week.]

Everybody's Business

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

Can Japan Exploit Its Gains?

SUPPOSING the worst happens in the Far East in the next few months and Japan overruns the Philippines, Malaya, the East Indies. Obviously the strategic consequences would be serious in the extreme, for we would have to fight from bases far removed from the ultimate objective, and that would mean the prolongation of the war, perhaps by years. But it is not my task to discuss military affairs. The question I wish to pose is this: Would Japan's conquest of these countries so increase its economic strength as to offset its fundamentally unsound economic position? Certainly we should suffer by the loss of raw-material assets of the first importance, but would Japan secure an equivalent profit? Would it, like Germany, succeed in exploiting the resources of the lands it occupied and thus be able to furnish the needs of its war machine for an indefinite period?

Japan's economic deficiencies are well known. It can barely feed itself under favorable conditions, and it lacks almost all the basic raw materials. It has insufficient coal, iron, and other metals and practically no oil. Except for silk it does not even produce the raw materials for its great textile industries. Nor is its industrial equipment equal to the demands of modern warfare, and on this point I quote the cold assessment of its Nazi allies. The 1938 edition of the *Kriegswirtschaftliche Jahresberichte*, that final authority on the peculiarly German science of war economics, passes the following verdict: "In the event of war with one or more big industrial powers, Japan's present industrial capacity is not great enough to supply its needs, particularly with regard to iron and steel, the production of which, in addition, is largely dependent on foreign raw materials." Another leading German publication, *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, supplements this finding with some interesting statistics:

A total of 2,369,277 workers are employed in 85,174 factories employing a minimum of 5 workers, that is, an average of about 27 workers per factory. In view of the fact that in 1914 there was an average of 29 workers per factory employed in 31,717 establishments, it becomes astonishingly clear that, despite a very considerable extension of its productive machinery, Japan retains its original organization of production in small and even minute units. . . . The backwardness of the Japanese engineering industry . . . and the very narrow basis of iron and steel production, despite all the efforts of the state to develop heavy industries, represent two of Japan's main weaknesses.

The countries now threatened by Japan's drive into the western Pacific are all rich in raw materials. The Philippines produce large quantities of hemp, sugar, and coconut oil and possess extensive though only partially developed mineral resources, including gold, lead, zinc, copper, iron ore, coal, chrome, and manganese. Malaya is the world's largest producer of both tin and rubber, but Japan has already adequate quantities of these commodities at its disposal in Indo-China and Thailand. As far as tin is concerned, however, Japan must still solve the problem of smelting the ore, for the two great smelters of the Far East are at Penang and

Singapore. The former has already been destroyed, and undoubtedly the latter would be also before Singapore was surrendered. Has Japan the material and technical resources to rebuild them rapidly?

The same question arises in regard to the oil fields of the Netherlands Indies, which, if captured intact, would supply the conqueror with lavish supplies of oil. But the Dutch have long been prepared to apply scorched-earth methods to their coveted wealth, and there is no reason to believe they would hesitate to pull the switches if the fatal moment came. Could the Japanese produce the steel, the drilling equipment, the machinery, and above all the engineering skill which would be required to restore these fields before their own oil reserves were exhausted?

In attempting to answer such questions it is most illuminating to turn to the Japanese record in China. Ten years ago Japan took over Manchoukuo as a going concern by a sudden coup. It is a fertile land which has been called "the granary of Eastern Asia," and it is rich in minerals. The Japanese have set up there a complicated economic organization which has succeeded in increasing production of coal, iron, and other industrial goods. But this result has been achieved at the cost of heavy investments of capital which Japan could not really afford. Its balance of trade with Manchoukuo has been consistently "favorable," which means that in order to build and maintain its various projects Japan has had to export there far more goods than it has received in return. Moreover, it has had to send capital goods of the kind with which it is insufficiently supplied at home. The situation is the exact opposite of that resulting from Germany's conquests. Hitler's victims have mostly been fairly advanced industrial states from which he has been able to force the export of billions of dollars' worth of goods, financed either by "occupation charges" or by German I. O. U.'s.

China proper has yielded Japan even smaller economic benefits than has Manchoukuo. The invaders have instituted an impressive paper organization of half-public, half-private development companies with strings of subsidiary corporations for the promotion of such industries as coal, cotton, tobacco, and furs. The actual results seem much less impressive. Cotton was one of the commodities which the Japanese hoped to get out of China and so relieve their dependence on the United States and India. *Fortune* of September, 1941, reports that in 1937, before the China "incident" started, Japan imported 53,000,000 pounds of cotton from China. The next year the figure jumped to 191,000,000 thanks to the looting of warehouse stocks, but in 1939 there was a slump to only 8,500,000 pounds. Influenced both by patriotism and the Japanese policy of paying low fixed prices, the Chinese peasant cotton-growers had undertaken a most successful sitdown strike. Apart from a minor increase in coal exports from China, Japan's attempted exploitation of other raw materials has been equally disappointing.

Japan's only hope of rendering its Chinese conquests profitable lay in conciliation of the peasants and workers. But the "honorary Asiatic Aryans" are as arrogant as their Nazi brothers, and their regime of terror, corruption, and avarice has thoroughly convinced the Chinese that they are being asked to cooperate in their own enslavement. There is no reason to suppose that the Japanese would handle

Filipinos or Malays any more intelligently even if they were able to find solutions for the innumerable technical problems which they will encounter in making economic use of their conquests.

In the Wind

BUNDLES FOR BRITAIN now occupies one of the old New York offices of the America First Committee. . . . The Yorkville Casino, which showed German films prior to America's entry into the war, closed on December 8. It has reopened and now shows Russian motion pictures.

ALTHOUGH HE HAS VOLUNTEERED for service against the Japanese, Colonel Lindbergh still holds, in addition to his Nazi decorations, a medal from the Order of Merit of the Rising Sun.

THE LATEST PLAN to speed up defense work is the "Bridges plan" for shipping, sponsored by Harry Bridges's friends in the West Coast maritime unions.

THE NEW NAME of the Keep America Out of War Congress, which fought the interventionists largely on the ground that war would inevitably put an end to democracy, is the Provisional Committee Toward a Democratic Peace. Many of the former isolationists who worked with the K. A. O. W. C. will not cooperate with the new committee.

RUDOLPH HESS'S last New Year's greeting to Hitler is recalled by the British Press Service: "My Führer! The whole German nation accompanies you with ardent wishes into the New Year which will bring the final victory."

A BRITISH AIR-RAID WARDEN recently wrote this parody of the first verse of Gray's "Elegy":

The sirens sound the knell of parting day,
The bombing planes drone loudly overhead,
The warden outward plods his weary way,
And warns the town it's time to leave its bed.

AN ATTEMPT to organize a debate on state medicine was made by a faculty-student group at St. Bartholomew's, one of London's largest hospitals and medical colleges. The debate could not be held because no student would speak against socialized medicine.

FROM AN ARTICLE about Russia in *Illustrated*, a British picture magazine: "Owing to the revolution, the question of officering the navy has been a difficult one. This is illustrated by the fact that both Vice-Admirals Tributs and Oktiabrsky, who have now respectively commanded the Baltic and Black Sea fleets for over two years, began their naval careers as lower deck-ratings in 1919."

[The \$5 prize for the best item received in December goes to S. R. of New York City for his story on tank production, published December 27.]

A Native at Large

BY JONATHAN DANIELS

Waging War Between Week-Ends

IF Mrs. Roosevelt is anything like my wife, that descent of unexpected guests on the White House just before Christmas helped make no holiday. I know that Mrs. Roosevelt did not have to run to the store and buy an extra turkey for Mr. Churchill and his companions who appeared out of secrecy. Without her help over the mixing bowl, there was enough plum pudding to go round. She had a job in the house all the same on that Christmas which the President and the Prime Minister filled with conferences. But on Friday morning, as she has stated in her capacity as reporter, she was back at her job in the Office of Civilian Defense. Her staff had arrived before her. But, she wrote in telling America about her day after Christmas, "so many people left Washington for the week-end that there was comparatively little to do."

Mrs. Roosevelt may have intended no rebuke in that sentence, but the sound of it ought to be still cracking in Washington like a whip lash out of the White House. Obviously, under the circumstances, when she wrote in the Office of Civilian Defense nineteen days after Pearl Harbor that "there was comparatively little to do," she meant that comparatively little could be done. And it could not be done because so many of those in the national government charged at this hour with important duties took not only Christmas Day off but the long week-end after it as well.

Already there has been plenty of talk about longer hours for labor. An admiral and a general have already been put out of their places because of the general suspicion, supported by Secretary Knox, that they did not have their men on the alert on that Sunday morning, which they thought was a Sunday in peace time, in Hawaii. Still, on the published testimony of the best possible witness in America it is clear that in the third week of a war which had produced nothing but bad news a great many officials in Washington had not yet learned that we can't win this war between week-ends.

There seems to be something peculiarly symbolic about week-ends in the weaknesses of the English-speaking peoples. Maybe, as Lady Astor has said, the Cliveden set was never anything but a cliché in a political mythology. The world was told anyhow that on long week-ends at Cliveden the languidness of appeasement grew with the leisure of fine talk by elegant people. Even since the war began, some Englishmen have charged that other Eng-

lishmen at home and in embattled colonies could not get along without their week-ends. Even in Washington some of our defense chiefs have had their splendid places and their excellent parties over the week-ends in the hills of Virginia. Outside Washington in other American cities the people far below the plutocrats have packed the Friday, Saturday, and Sunday roads with their escape from serious concerns. It certainly has been nice. It still is pleasant. But the spectacle of so many officials in Washington going off to enjoy themselves that the wife of the President in her capacity as one of the war's working women couldn't get work done looks more damaging to me than anything the Japanese have got.

Every American knows that straight through Christmas as well as the week-end that followed it many men in Washington, including the President and many anonymous Americans, worked night and day on the war effort, just as men in the Pacific fought straight through a holiday marked by death and not rejoicing. From Cabinet ministers to messenger boys there was no need to take down the sign "Men at Work." But as Mrs. Roosevelt herself tells us, many others were not at work. Their telephones did not answer. While the country was being asked to "Remember Pearl Harbor," they apparently didn't even remember there was a war. As far as they were concerned, Christmas ran from Wednesday to Monday. And during that time the war could wait.

Maybe I'm unduly indignant. It is easy to exaggerate the importance of some officials merely because they are in Washington. In spite of the fact that Mrs. Roosevelt could not get them when she tried to get them, maybe if they had stayed at their desks they would not have added much push toward victory. Everybody knows that there are plenty of week-enders who are more useful on a week-end than at any other time. There are probably some such in Washington. But if we are really serious about this war, they ought not to be there long. As long as they are there, they may do more damage than use up space in a crowded town. They can dampen enthusiasm in a hard-pressed America. They can confuse the quality of all leadership. Not only did their action constitute a sort of self-indulgent walk-out on a desperate war. Also, it provided—and might provide again—an example in complacency which might make a plant builder or a ship worker slow, if it did not make him, as a citizen, sick both at his heart and at his stomach. We cannot have the work we need to win this war and long week-ends in Washington at the same time.

BOOKS *and the* ARTS

New Year Poem

Love, and do what you will.—St. Augustine

BY GEORGE BARKER

Rise from my hand like the martyr from fire
Aspiring to prove that nevertheless it is love.
So like the criminal liberated from prison
The lesson is taught: otherwise we cannot live.
Too little time is left now, too little time.

Pretty my pretty who curl your hair with love
This is not it, the crush and rub in the prison
Of the double clutch that makes the time take fire.
For all this, for which too much we live,
Too little time is left now, too little time.

From hand to hand the human in their prison
Pass love like cigarettes. Thus love, like fire,
Keeps us all warm no matter where we live:
The ashes in the mouth speak best of love.
Too little time is left now, too little time.

The saint is happy in the forgiven fire.
Its liberated kiss, whereby he shall live,
Proves that the Evil is what is not loved
Loathing itself in its so lonely prison.
Too little time is left now, too little time.

And now, unless we love, no one will live
To see all creatures rise kissing from the fire
Like liberated birds from that luxurious prison
Where they have everything excepting love.
Too little time is left now, too little time.

A Letter from Paris

[The following report was recently received in New York.
For obvious reasons the name of the writer cannot be given.
—EDITORS THE NATION.]

IN THE cinema the other night there was a film showing German soldiers goose-stepping up the Champs Elysées toward the Arc de Triomphe. As French people have been forbidden to whistle, many of them began to cough in an unmistakable way. The film was stopped. Lights were turned on. An officer from the *Kommandatur* demanded who had started the disgraceful noise. For ten minutes the German officer shouted threats. Finally, an old gentleman with a white beard stood up. "It was not me, Monsieur," he said. "It was the Unknown Soldier."

Of course, after the cinema one must take the Métro—or walk. Naturally, the Métro was crammed. In our car one couldn't even bow to one's friends. But everyone knew, some-

how, that there was a German officer among us. After the second stop I saw—and I think everyone else realized—that someone had pinned a gigantic paper V to the officer's back. At the next stop everyone in the car got out. None of us wanted to be shot. I saw an old lady rush into the car. She sat down and looked about wonderingly. She saw the officer's back. She ran to the door. She was trembling so much that it took her some time to open it. When the train was starting she jumped out. If I hadn't been there she would have fallen.

A few days before this a workingman had stabbed a German officer in the Métro station of the Bastille. Everyone on the platform and on the train was arrested. A certain number of them were allowed to see their families. They were optimistic and said they would be home soon. They were executed the next day.

Paris looks sad. The swastika flies above every public monument, and now Paris is called "*La ville sans regard.*" Since the war against Russia many German soldiers have disappeared, but they have been replaced by *Frauen in Uniform*. All night clubs are open and filled with Germans and their collaborationist friends. Life is very gay, and champagne flows like water—but French people (if there are any) must leave at 11:30 or stay until the curfew ends at five in the morning. The *Bœuf sur le Toit* has been forced to move four times, each time having to remove its enormous and famous cellar. The reason given was that Jews and odd intellectuals frequented the place. The "*Bœuf*" still exists, thanks to the intervention of Jean Cocteau, who is an active collaborationist.

Theaters begin at 7:30 because the last Métro is at 11:15, and every person must be home by midnight. German officers and soldiers and collaborationists (in evening dress) are predominant at the opera. Very few French people go and then in ordinary dress, as a sign of mourning. Serge Lifar's ballets had an enormous success last winter, and he himself is now resting in Venice. Pablo Picasso has been released from prison and is now working at a big statue which he hides jealously even from his admirers. Derain and Dufy are also working in Paris and keeping very much to themselves. On the other hand, Sacha Guitry collaborates actively with the Germans. Jean Giono, who recently wrote "*Le Bout de la Route*," invited General von Stülpnagel, head of the *Kommandatur*, to the première.

The most popular book in the occupied zone is the "*Journal*" of André Gide, now unobtainable. The Germans asked Gide to make a new cheap edition in which he should omit the "offensive" passages. Gide answered No. He has also handed in his resignation to the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, which is now divided into two camps. I suppose everyone knows that *L'Illustration* has become practically a German magazine—in fact, one of Hitler's favorites. *Match* (the French *Life*) no longer exists, but has been replaced by the German picture magazine *Signal*. Parisians no longer read newspapers—which is the same as saying Americans no longer chew gum. But the edition which announced the

attempt on Laval's life was sold out within two minutes.

Marcel Bataillon, a professor at the Sorbonne and a specialist on American questions, has been arrested because of his "spirit of rebellion." In university circles professors as well as students are against collaboration. In spite of the danger, one often sees students demonstrating in the streets.

In the Louvre there are only empty rooms; many chefs-d'œuvre have been put in the provinces—the provinces of "the other France" as it is ironically called in the occupied zone. All Jewish collections—given or lent to the state—have been taken by the Germans, not only from the Louvre, but from other museums also. All Jewish property has been requisitioned, and that's only a little finger of what they do to the Jews. Hostages?

Food and cigarettes scarcely exist, though the tobacco crop is much larger than normal. Nevertheless, a man in France is allowed two packages of ordinary cigarettes every ten days. Women are not allowed to buy tobacco in any form. Each person in France is allowed one egg each month. Wine—ordinary red wine—is so closely rationed that a workingman can have but one bottle a week. I thought that at least the lack of wine—which grows in France and which France exports—could not be blamed on the English blockade. But yes. The newspapers say that the lack of wine is caused by the fact that the African colonies can no longer ship as much as usual to the mother-country.

However, the black market exists. And at the Cafe Weber one can have an omelette (two eggs) for sixty francs. Prices are so astronomical that money hasn't a normal value. Everyone tries to buy something solid—land, pictures, diamonds.

All the pigeons of Paris are dead. Some have been eaten, which is natural, but most of them have been condemned to death because they carry messages.

Roosevelt's State Papers

THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. Compiled and Collated by Samuel I. Rosenman. Volumes for 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940. The Macmillan Company. \$30.

DID any other President of the United States ever have so keen a consciousness of history as has Franklin D. Roosevelt? He has not only established the library at Hyde Park, where eventually all his papers will be collected, but he has also taken care to publish the more important of them along with notes that seem designed, consciously or unconsciously, to clothe many of his public acts in their most pleasing dress. The four volumes under review cover the second administration, and are thus a continuation of the five similar volumes published in 1938, which covered Mr. Roosevelt's first administration and his two terms as Governor of New York.

Books like these, of course, are intended first of all for reference, but there is much in them of high and immediate interest. This statement applies not only to the introduction which Mr. Roosevelt has written for each volume and to the notes which he has appended to some of the documents but also to many of the messages and speeches and, above all, to the reports of the press conferences. It is in them that

Mr. Roosevelt's love for life and for his high office bubbles forth in all its amazing gusto. He teases the reporters, he lectures them, and he laughs with them and at them. He even laughs at himself. The humor will perhaps not split your sides, but it will serve; and can you imagine it happening anywhere else in the world during this period? Historians may find it significant that in their great day of trouble the democracies were led by a man who could laugh.

Three of the conferences were with special groups, and one on April 21, 1938, with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, is worthy of special mention. The President was in high fettle. Earlier on that same day he had spoken to the Daughters of the American Revolution, and he had told them: "Remember, remember always, that all of us, and you and I especially, are descended from immigrants and revolutionists." The Daughters had not liked it much, and the newspaper editors were not too pleased when the President said he was putting them in the same category with the D. A. R. He gave them a lecture of straight, hard facts. Nor were these editors stooges: they asked questions that were just as sharp as his answers. The conference was a long one, for it covers thirty-five printed pages, and at the end the President said: "I enjoyed all the shafts, and I think I returned them with interest, so it is all right [*applause*]."

Another occasion when the President was in good form was on December 18, 1940, when he vetoed the Walter-Logan bill to regulate administrative agencies. Without wasting a word Mr. Roosevelt tears the bill to shreds. First he declares that in our times the administrative tribunal is a necessity for cheapening, expediting, and simplifying the judicial process. Then he shows that the bill was intended, not to improve the administrative process, as was claimed for it, but to hamstring New Deal reforms. Finally he finishes off the bill with the assertion that it was so sloppily drawn as to be unworkable. It is worth recalling that the veto was sustained. This veto message is Mr. Roosevelt at his best, and it is a model of what a state paper ought to be.

The President is not always so felicitous. In the introduction to the 1938 volume he refers to the so-called "purge" of that year and makes what seems to me the unassailable point that as leader of his party he had the right to express his choice in the primaries. But Mr. Roosevelt neglects to mention the not unimportant fact that the "purge" was generally unsuccessful, nor does he adduce any reason for this lack of success. Some people have suggested that the "purge" failed because the President's prestige as *President* is so great that when he opposes a candidate the people are inclined to support that candidate through their natural sympathy for the under-dog. A more important reason in 1938, I think, was that wherever the President failed, the state or district party organization was in the hands of his enemies. It will scarcely be disputed that the party organizations, especially in the South, and to a lesser degree in the Northern cities and states, are still in the hands of the reactionaries, who are biding their time to take over. Does this throw some doubt on Mr. Roosevelt's foresight as a politician? He has been acclaimed as the master-politician of his time, but he is not without weaknesses, especially with regard to building the party for the future.

Mr. Roosevelt deals more candidly with the Supreme Court

fight. His position, as he outlines it in the introduction to the 1937 volume, is that there is nothing wrong with the Supreme Court as an institution. The fault lay, he writes, with the reactionary members of the court, who he charges were determined to remain on the bench as long as life continued—"for the sole purpose of blocking any program of reform." After reading this strong indictment, it is surprising to discover that no such charge is made in the message sent to Congress on February 5, 1937. Here the emphasis is on insufficient personnel, aged judges, and crowded dockets. Mr. Roosevelt now acknowledges that this was a major mistake. He writes: "I did not place enough emphasis on the real mischief." However, Mr. Roosevelt regards the real battle as having been won when the Supreme Court suddenly began to reverse itself after March 29, 1937.

But will Mr. Roosevelt be remembered as the architect of the New Deal or as a war leader? It was Woodrow Wilson's fate to have the New Freedom washed out in war, and such may be the fate of Mr. Roosevelt's New Deal. About the first foretaste of war occurs in the 1937 volume, May 1, when the Spanish arms embargo was proclaimed. In an appended note the President still appears inclined to defend the American policy in the Spanish war. He declares, first, that a vast majority of Americans then believed in complete isolation in so far as sale of military supplies was concerned, and, second, that Franco controlled more shipping than did the Loyalists, and would thus have benefited more than they from arms shipments. Will either point bear expert examination?

The next foretaste of war is in the famous "quarantine" address, delivered at Chicago on October 5, 1937. The speech seems rather vague now, but it was a warning of what has come to pass, and if attention had been paid to it, the war might have been averted. By the time of the Munich crisis it was probably too late. The President's message to the powers on September 26, 1938, and his appeal to Hitler on September 27 are presented here without comment. They make strange reading. They seem so utterly detached from the realities of the gathering conflict that one wonders why it was considered worth the tolls to cable them abroad.

Now it grows very late. It was on January 3, 1939, that the President said to Congress: "There are many methods short of war but stronger and more effective than mere words . . ." of coping with the aggressors. Oh, how late this was: in nine months Europe would be at war. How perfectly clear it is now that the short-of-war policy was not announced until long after war was inevitable. Even so, American complacency remained unshaken until the fall of France was imminent, and it was not until May 16, 1940, that Mr. Roosevelt asked Congress for \$896,000,000 in additional funds for defense. On June 10, the day that Italy attacked France, Mr. Roosevelt pledged the material resources of the United States to the Allies, and a few days later he repeated the pledge to Premier Paul Reynaud of France. The pledge to Reynaud was straightforward and emphatic, and there appears to be no basis, so far as the text of the message is concerned, for the oft-repeated charge that Mr. Roosevelt's reply to Reynaud was ambiguous and no pledge at all.

After the message to Reynaud, however, there is a lull, for this was an election year. The American people were

"He is one of the
deepest thinkers
of all times."—
ETIENNE GILSON

A Milestone in
Modern Thought

Jacques Maritain's Ransoming The Time

The universal ideas that Maritain discusses in this monumental new work are those that have become today's crucial issues—such warring ideas as "Human Equality" and "Anti-Christian Philosophy of Enslavement."

Ranging over a rich variety of topics—among them, "The Political Ideas of Pascal," "The Metaphysics of Bergson," "The Cooperation of Men of Different Creeds," "The Mystery of Israel"—Maritain unites the resources of thought, faith and concrete experience in a broad, timely, brilliantly-developed philosophy for today's crisis. \$3.00

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS • NEW YORK

To keep abreast of HISTORY in the MAKING

FILL OUT AND MAIL THIS

Order Form

THE NATION • 55 FIFTH AVE. • NEW YORK

In order for me to keep abreast of history in the making, please enter my subscription to *The Nation* for the period indicated below. I inclose \$.....

☐ One year \$5

☐ Two Years \$8

☐ Three Years \$11

Special Introductory Offer

☐ 13 Weeks \$1

Name.....

Address.....

Foreign and Canadian postage \$1 a year 1-10-42

comforting themselves back into complacency as neither candidate faced the war issue squarely. Mr. Roosevelt's five campaign speeches are printed here, and the great speech at Cleveland is worth reading again. It was an extremely serious speech for a campaign (as it is printed there are no indications of laughter), and it reads just as nobly as it sounded. Mr. Roosevelt that night stood on a mountain top.

Many people expected that immediately after his reelection the President would act strongly on our relation to the war, and they were disappointed when nothing happened. But on December 17, at a press conference, when Mr. Roosevelt outlined his lend-lease plan, it was apparent that he had been thinking to good effect. What a perfectly brilliant plan this was, how reasonable, and yet how inevitably it would, if vigorously carried out, force the Nazi powers into defeat or oblige them to accept the onus of shooting first. This was the war of nerves stretched almost beyond endurance, and it would be the Nazis' nerves that broke, not Mr. Roosevelt's. If it is true that under great stress Hitler chews the carpet, he must have eaten a wide swatch of it that day.

The four volumes are now almost at an end. There are three more documents worthy of mention. On December 29, the President gave a fireside chat in which he promised that the United States would be "the arsenal of democracy." On January 6, 1941, he outlined to Congress the lend-lease plan and formally presented the "four freedoms." And finally, on January 16, the President asked Congress for \$300,000,000 for emergency cargo vessels. That is the last item. But it is clear now that all that came afterward had to be. The American people did not know it, and whether the President knew it or not is for history to answer, but we were inevitably on our way to our "rendezvous with destiny" at Pearl Harbor.

CHARLES CURTIS MUNZ

Bedtime Stories

HOW TO BECOME EXTINCT. By Will Cuppy. Illustrated by William Steig. Farrar and Rinehart. \$2.

DO YOU know all you really should about the habits of the viviparous Blenny? If not, please consult Mr. Cuppy, who is at the top of his form and up to his old trick of making natural history—to say nothing of natural historians—look foolish. Most of his facts are derived from the best sources, and he is right up to date when it comes to disputed points, but the man who first thought "sober" the correct adjective to go with "truth" was probably not a biologist. One famous geneticist known to the present reviewer rereads Mr. Cuppy's previous treatise "How to Tell Your Friends from the Apes" once a year, and "How to Become Extinct" belongs on the same shelf. What advice could possibly be sounder than "When you hunt rattlesnakes, be sure to take along some high shoes, a pair of leather puttees, and, if possible, Dr. Ditmars"? And how can one be redeemed from a vulgar error more pleasantly than by reading the following passage:

I'm sorry, but Chameleons do not turn the color of their surroundings as they certainly should. Their color changes are caused by light, temperature, and mood, and not by what they are on at the time. Professors who watch

Chameleons to find out these things are called Chameleon watchers. They watch Chameleons for hours at a stretch and often change their colors much more than Chameleons do. In bright sunlight a green Chameleon turns brown with lighter blotches. The professor turns purple with reddish spots. Little is known of the Chameleon's private life, and that is always a bad sign.

Mr. Cuppy is evidently sound on the subject of evolution but plainly has some doubt concerning its direction. Or so at least I deduce from such footnotes as that on the brain development of the Stegosaurus ("The animal mind was not perfected until the Pleistocene period, when it developed the ability to worry") or the one in the fish section which reads: "Much of the Minnow's sexual behavior may be ascribed to reflex or involuntary actions. Voluntary actions are the result of thought. That is why they seem so foolish." The plain implication seems to be that the Dodo had the right idea.

Since one of the chief rewards of reviewing is the occasional opportunity to shame one's betters in print, I should like to point out that Mr. Cuppy is seriously in error in implying that the Tetras and the Danios are viviparous, when, as a matter of fact, they lay eggs more profusely than the most extravagant hen that ever figured in a how-to-get-rich-on-poultry-farming ad. Perhaps this will teach him to show a little more sympathy for Aristotle and even to wonder whether or not anyone will ever put him in a poem as "the master of those who know." If not, I will add: "The book has, unfortunately, no index."

It does, however, have a lot of very fine drawings by William Steig, which suggests the old story about the marine painter who remarked when over-persuaded to do a friend's portrait: "All right. I'll paint your portrait. But I warn you it's going to look sort of like a ship." Mr. Steig's sticklebacks and garter snakes bear a strong family resemblance to those little boys and girls of his who always look as though they knew more than they should—and about the wrong things.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

The Problem of Power

DESIGN FOR POWER. By Frederick L. Schuman. Maps by George D. Brodsky. Alfred A. Knopf. \$3.50.

ALL but the final twenty pages of this book represent a history of the Second World War, right up to the moment when it became a *world* war in fact. There may be some question about the value of such a work, lacking, as it must, any new sources of information not available to the careful reader of the daily newspaper and the wider historical perspective without which a historical catastrophe of the kind in which we are involved cannot be fully comprehended. Such a history cannot be much more than journalism. It is, in fact, somewhat similar to the afternoon newspaper which contains only the score of the first half of the football game.

Nevertheless, Professor Schuman is amply justified in what he has done. For his journalism has a purpose. He intends to give us as comprehensive a picture as possible of the stupidity, the evasions, and the incredible blindness of the various anti-Nazi forces as they met, or failed to meet, the

threat and the reality of Nazi aggression. While all the facts are familiar enough, there is value in having them strung as beads upon this tragic historical rosary so that we can "tell them over one by one."

The basic purpose of this survey is fully revealed in the final chapter of the book, which is devoted to an impassioned plea for a democratic federation of the world, as the only possibility of salvation for our civilization. We cannot suffer the tyrannical unification of the world which the Nazis propose, but neither can we survive under the anarchy which must inevitably be the consequence of the extension or the merely minor modification of the policies which the democracies have thus far pursued. "Anarchy in world politics," declares the author, is "incompatible with unity and order in world business and world civilization. One or the other must go."

The tremendous sense of urgency in this final chapter is justified by the urgency of the problem which it confronts. We must find political instruments of world organization, compatible with the necessities of economic interdependence on a world scale, or perish. The difficulty with the chapter is that its arguments are more impassioned than discriminating. We are told that "the next instalment of the price [of redemption from anarchy] is the abolition of the 'sovereignty' and 'independence' of states." Quite obviously the author is thinking in terms, not of the limitation, but of the total abrogation, of national sovereignties, which means that he wants a world super-state. But he does not discuss either the political feasibility or the desirability of such a proposal. Where will the locus of this state be? How will the international impartiality of its armies be guaranteed? In what sense will it be democratic?

One cannot be at all certain that the author is thinking of a democratic world order. He speaks of a "new élite" supplying its "political leadership." He compares it with the Roman Empire and holds out the hope that it will abolish "international conflict and class conflict" as "did the empire of ancient Rome." (The idea that the Roman Empire abolished class conflict is rather breath-taking.) Where will the hegemony in this world federation be rooted? The author suggests an Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the words: "[The world] will be federated either by the triple alliance and its vassals or by a dynamic Anglo-America, supported by Latin America, by Russia, and by free India and China." It is realistic to assume that the victorious nations will in fact have a hegemony in a new world federation. But the important point is to provide constitutional instruments to prevent such a hegemony from being nothing more than Anglo-Saxon imperialism in a new guise.

The whole problem of power is dealt with as inexactly as is that of the relation of central authority in a super-state to the constitutional forms which must prevent the central authority from becoming tyrannical. We are told that "power politics" must go. Yet there is no other kind of politics than power politics, in the sense that the problem of government is to organize, harmonize, and arbitrate the conflicting vitalities and powers of life on every level and in every breadth of human existence. What Professor Schuman really means is that the anarchy of conflicting power must go. He would bring harmony out of chaos by the imposition of an imperial

AMUSEMENTS

CARNEGIE HALL — TUESDAY EVE., JANUARY 13
S. HUOK presents

CARMEN AMAYA

and her Troupe of Gypsy Dancers and Musicians
with **ANTONIO TRIANA**

TICKETS NOW AT BOX OFFICE — \$1.10, \$1.65, \$2.20, \$2.75



"The one memorable play of the new season." — *Richard Lockridge, Sun*

THE THEATRE GUILD and THE PLAYWRIGHTS' Company present

HELEN HAYES

Maxwell Anderson's **CANDLE IN THE WIND**

SHUBERT THEA. W. 44 St. Eves. 8:35. Mats. Thurs. & Sat. 2:35. Cl 6-5999

THE THEATRE GUILD Presents

PAPA IS ALL

PATTERSON GREENE'S Riotous Comedy
with **JESSIE ROYCE LANDIS**
CARL BENTON REID

GUILD THEA.

52nd St., W. of B'way.

EVES. 8:35. MATS.

Thurs. & Sat. at 2:35.

"Buoyant,
Giddy and
Funny . . .
Ought to
make everyone
very happy."
— *Atkinson, Times*

Max Gordon presents

JUNIOR MISS

A New Comedy by Jerome Chodorov and Joseph Fields
Based on the stories by Sally Benson — Directed by Moss Hart
LYCEUM Theatre, 45th St. E. of B'way. CH. 4-4256
Evenings, 8:40; Matinees, WEDNESDAY & SATURDAY, 2:40

"A GALE OF LAUGHTER." — *Atkinson, Times.*

MY SISTER EILEEN

THE RIOTOUS LAUGH HIT

BILTMORE THEATRE, 47th St. W. of B'way—Circle 6-9858
Eves., 8:40 — Mats.: Wednesday and Saturday, 2:40

Order your

BOOKS

from *THE NATION*

At the request of many readers who reside in communities in which no bookshop has been established, *The Nation* offers to deliver any book to your door at the regular publisher's price (postfree) provided payment is received with the order or publisher's price plus postage if sent C. O. D.

Please address your orders to

THE READERS' SERVICE DIVISION

The Nation • 55 Fifth Avenue • New York

power, which is certainly "power politics." But he leaves the important question unanswered: how the imposition of imperial power can be so modified by democratic techniques on a world scale that it will not degenerate into tyrannical power. It is certainly better to approach the problem from his end than from that of those utopians who dream of a world federation without asking where power and authority are going to reside. They would not get much farther than present anarchy. But if Professor Schuman has gone beyond imperialism in his projected rule of the élite (as he undoubtedly has in his mind) he has not specified it in his program.

Every major and minor prophet in the land is talking world federation now. The desperate necessity of this new advance in world organization cannot be denied. The prophets could be left to supply the fervor if the political scientists would give us precise specifications on how this stupendous task of world organization is to be achieved.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

More About South America

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH AMERICA. By Albert E. Carter.

The Bobbs-Merrill Company. \$2.75.

SOUTH AMERICA AND HEMISPHERE DEFENSE. By

J. Fred Rippy. Louisiana State University Press. \$1.50.

PARADOXICALLY speaking, Hitler has become a Columbus in reverse; he has rediscovered South America for us. The plain truth is that our sudden interest is motivated by fear of Nazi control over the lands south of the Panama Canal. Much to our dismay we realize how deeply the Nazis have intrenched themselves in countries which we had neglected for generations. One of the by-products of this situation is that the market is swamped by books on South America. A host of cruise travelers feel the irresistible urge to record their impressions, mainly based on official tourist folders, reference books, enlightenment derived from English-speaking hotel clerks and sympathetic night-club entertainers. On a higher level than these irritatingly false travelogues are the summarizing reports, covering in streamlined fashion all republics, by economists, journalists, and writers. The trouble with such otherwise valuable accounts is that the visitors are often after the same information, see the same places, talk to the same newspapermen, politicians, professors, and that, consequently, they arrive at the same conclusions. John Gunther's "Inside Latin America" is the most successful example of this type of political reportage. Relatively rare, however, are serious studies either on special problems concerning all states or dealing thoroughly with one country only—the South American states are as different from one another as states in Europe. Only such studies, based on a more than superficial knowledge, are of real value.

Mr. Carter's book is a report by an observant newspaperman who had studied the general subject before he went "on location." He knows the tricks of his trade and has the ability to size up complicated political situations neatly and intelligently. The book lacks the brilliance of Gunther's presentation in spite of many verbal flashes; it avoids also Gunther's crude mistakes. But it suffers from the superficiality of hurriedly gathered information in too many countries. Its

main merit is that it offers a reliable guide through the maze of internal politics in each state. Naturally enough, like any recent visitor, the author is struck by the extent of Axis influence, but he seems to overestimate the beneficial results of our Good Neighbor policy, notable as has been its success in alleviating apprehensions about the "Colossus of the North." Many of the governments are purely opportunistic; only the masses are democratic and pro-Ally. The recent outburst of hemisphere solidarity should not be mistaken for a genuine change of mind on the part of the fence-sitters, many of whom have been driven to our side by sheer fear of the Axis. If a third front is opened against the United States, the invader is likely to find his Quislings and bandwagon-climbers not only in the well-organized German-Japanese fifth column but also among the governing classes which now protest their solidarity with us.

Professor Rippy's book cannot be exactly fitted into any of the categories mentioned before. Certainly it is not a travelogue. But the form which one of the best experts in Hispanic history and politics has chosen militates against comprehensiveness and density of presentation. The book is made up of four lectures given at Louisiana State University, two of them dealing with South American history and politics, two with economics and finance. Replete with facts, admirably objective, it offers to the serious reader more reliable information than many more voluminous and pretentious books on the subject.

KARL LOEWENSTEIN

Clara Barton

CLARA BARTON: DAUGHTER OF DESTINY. By

Blanche Colton Williams. J. B. Lippincott Company. \$3.50.

CLARA BARTON, five feet high and forty years old, was a clerk in the Patent Office in Washington when the Civil War broke out. "This conflict is one thing I've been waiting for," she said. "If I can't be a soldier, I'll help soldiers." It was characteristic of her that she did not join the Sanitary Commission or the nurses organized by Dorothea Dix, but got her supplies direct from the Quartermaster, rode with them to the front, and distributed them to the men with her own hands, while cannon shot fell around her. She went about overcoming the popular apathy and official opposition to the Treaty of Geneva in the same direct way and naturally grew to think of the American Red Cross as her own baby.

When at the age of eighty she was deprived of her personal control of the organization, she was indignant, hurt, and bewildered. It was at this time that she secreted the diaries and documents that Dr. Williams discovered and now makes public. The rows within the Red Cross have of course lost their interest, but Clara's own record of her frenzied activities "in the field"—during the Franco-Prussian War, at the Johnstown flood, and in Cuba—is fresh and revealing and justifies the subtitle of Dr. Williams's book. Destiny not only thrust Clara Barton into cataclysmic situations; it gave her the belligerency, the tenacity, and the amazing self-confidence to make the most of her opportunities.

GRACE ADAMS

IN BRIEF

THE WAR, SECOND YEAR. By Edgar McInnis. Oxford University Press. \$2.

Although written by a Canadian professor of history, this narrative of the current war is certainly no history, for many events are known only in so far as the belligerents wanted to reveal them. But it is not propaganda either, or rather it is excellent propaganda since one cannot help being impressed by the author's cool objectivity. It covers the occurrences from the Battle of Britain to the Battle of the Ukraine and finishes appositely by reviewing "the gyrations of Japanese policy." Because of the interest focused on the rushing scenery of the world drama this fortunate blend of journalism and scholarship is a useful reference book now, and because it is so meticulous it may prove helpful to the historian after the war. The author, in spite of his British viewpoint, is not only a reliable guide in the jungle of dazzling facts; he does not refrain from criticism, and he warns us particularly against unwarranted optimism. The book is written in a lively style and should be read by everybody who wishes to obtain an overall view of the bewildering events of our time.

A MIRROR FOR CALIFORNIANS.

By Oliver Carlson. The Bobbs-Merrill Company. \$2.50.

THEY WERE SAN FRANCISCANS.

By Miriam Allen de Ford. The Caxton Printers. \$3.50.

Written in a pleasantly journalistic style and a spirit of tolerant observation, the first of these two books is accurately described by its title. Those who know California will recognize its image while remembering that a mirror reflects only the surface. Cynics among them may be inclined to believe that a deeper examination might not produce very much more; but in his analysis of recent social and political trends Mr. Carlson reveals California as something more than an exhibit. No generalizations about California apply to San Francisco, which, Mr. Carlson agrees with Frank Norris, is, with New York and New Orleans, one of America's three "story cities." Miriam Allen de Ford's gossipy and readable stories of some of San Francisco's "characters," famous and not so famous, are flavorful samples of the city's teeming history.

FOUR YEARS IN PARADISE. By Osa Johnson. J. B. Lippincott Company. \$3.50.

Readers of "I Married Adventure" will remember Mrs. Johnson's brief account of the lost lake which she and her husband rediscovered and christened Lake Paradise. Her new book describes the four years they spent photographing animals there, and it ends with a letter from an English lieutenant whose company camped next to their old house late in 1940. Like its predecessors, "Four Years in Paradise" owes its appeal to its pleasant simplicity rather than to any really sensational adventures or any literary quality. The writing is simple almost to the point of naivete, but it does manage somehow to communicate the fact that the Johnsons were very likable people happily doing exactly what they wanted to do. No wonder that it makes very pleasant reading indeed. As usual there are some fine photographs and dozens of agreeable little anecdotes about animals, about native servants and helpers, about everyday life in a community of several hundred persons living far from the remotest outpost of civilization. Like "The Swiss Family Robinson," Mrs. Johnson's books are, whether she knows it or not, part of the eternally rewritten legend of the Golden Age.

PUBLISHED THIS WEEK

Canton Captain. By James B. Connolly. Doubleday, Doran. \$3.

Remaking America. By Jay Franklin. Houghton Mifflin. \$3.

The Southern Negro and the Public Library. By Eliza Atkins Gleason. Chicago. \$2.50.

Time Was: Death of a Junker. By Heinrich Hauser. Reynal and Hitchcock. \$3.

Brazil in Capitals. By Vera Kelsey. Harper. \$3.50.

Twelve Decisive Battles of the Mind. The Story of Propaganda During the Christian Era with Abridged Versions of Texts That Have Shaped History. By Gorham Munson. Greystone. \$3.50.

The Entertainment of a Nation. By George Jean Nathan. Knopf. \$2.50.

The United States and Civilization. By John U. Nef. Chicago. \$3.

Swift and Defoe. A Study in Relationship. By John F. Ross. California. \$1.50.

A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria, 1876-1878. By George Hoover Rupp. Harvard. \$5.

From the Land of Silent People. By Robert St. John. Doubleday, Doran. \$3.

The Plain Dealer: One Hundred Years in Cleveland. By Archer H. Shaw. Knopf. \$4.

Arms and the Aftermath. By Perrin Stryker. Houghton Mifflin. \$1.75.

The Creation of Purchasing Power. A Study in the Problem of Economic Stabilization. By David McCord Wright. Harvard. \$3.

DRAMA

The Unbeautiful People

WITH almost perfect unanimity the critics turned thumbs down on Clifford Odets's new play "Clash by Night" (Belasco Theater). The tone of the reviews was, indeed, one which seems reserved almost exclusively for dealing with works by new authors previously greeted with wild enthusiasm, and it is difficult not to feel that the reviewers, in the process of cooling off, frequently do somewhat less than justice to those they are afraid of having praised too much. Nearly every fault found in "Clash by Night" is, to be sure, really there. Certain scenes, for example, are unquestionably over-long, and the catastrophe, like that in most of the author's other plays, seems weak or at least less imaginative than the opening passages lead one to hope. But Mr. Odets, being a good writer, cannot be adequately described as the sum of his defects, and to me it seems positively monstrous to treat him as though he could. Whatever its faults, the new play has originality and power, and I am willing to wager that its severest critics will remember it long after they have forgotten other pieces successfully launched on the wave of their enthusiasm.

In subject matter and tone "Clash by Night" belongs in the category with "Rocket to the Moon." The setting is equally drab, the persons equally unbeautiful, and the story deliberately banal in much the same way. But like "Rocket to the Moon" all this is both more interesting and less painful than it seems to have any right to be because Odets has qualities very few of his contemporaries possess in anything like an equal degree. He had them from the very beginning, and they were responsible for the impression which "Awake and Sing" was able to produce, but they have become clearer and clearer as he has abandoned the preaching of a doctrine and left the plays to stand or fall by their imaginative force.

The first of these qualities is one of the most mysterious and most nearly unanalyzable in the whole repertory of artistic magic—namely, the power of

making things seem real. This has, of course, no necessary connection with what is called realism, and it is, on the other hand, identical with what ought to be the primary meaning of the word "imagination," or the power of creating imitations of reality which seem like reality itself. One recognizes it when one finds oneself accepting personages and actions directly and on their own terms rather than as typical characters or situations, when they remind one of nothing except themselves and not of either fiction or, even, experience. The quality is not incompatible, as in this case, with the fact that both the characters and the situations can be crudely described as banal or, as in the case of Shakespeare, with the fact that they can equally well be described as directly in an established convention. They are merely so completely realized that their existence is independent of either the actuality or the convention with which it is possible intellectually to connect them.

This power Mr. Odets has to a degree unequaled by any of his American contemporaries except Erskine Caldwell and Eugene O'Neill. In addition he has the power of communicating a special sort of compassion peculiarly his own. The preacher takes us down into the lower depths to arouse our indignation, the sentimentalist in order that we may discover there impossible virtues, and the decadent merely that we may wallow with him in congenial mud. Mr. Odets has been occasionally a preacher, but never a sentimentalist or a decadent, and at his best he is none of these. His people are certainly not beautiful people, and in "Clash by Night" there is not a single character "sympathetic" in the ordinary sense of the word. Yet there is not one with whom one does not sympathize, not one who is not pitiable, not one whom the spectator does not understand.

In his earlier plays Mr. Odets had a villain, "the social system." His best characters are still persons to whom lack of money is recurrently the dominant fact in life, but he has grown less and less interested in demonstrating this fact as a fact, more and more interested in picturing from the inside the tragedy of men and women who are victims of passion no less than of economics. Many of them have, like Odets himself, the gift of compassion, but suffering and frustration generate an egotism which overrides even compassion, and the result is a kind of tragedy which his plays define more and more clearly—the

tragedy of those who hurt others not in blindness or malice but only because they are themselves in agony.

None of this could mean much if Mr. Odets did not have the power of imagining his people with extraordinary solidity. But since that power has been given him, he is already one of the most impressive dramatists of our generation, and about "Clash by Night" I should like to make a prediction. If it is not too precipitately removed from the boards it will find a rewarding audience.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

RECORDS

FURTHER December releases from Victor include "Great Songs of Faith" (Set 850, \$3.50): the beautiful "He Shall Feed His Flock" from Handel's "Messiah" (18324), with "He Was Despised and Rejected" on the reverse side; the deeply affecting "Es ist vollbracht" from Bach's St. John Passion (18326); and the less consequential "O Rest in the Lord" from Mendelssohn's "Elijah" and "But the Lord Is Mindful of His Own" from his "St. Paul" (18325). These are sung by Marian Anderson with an orchestra conducted by Charles O'Connell. Reports that Anderson has been singing with less constriction and forcing and less consequent tremolo are confirmed by these records: never in recent years have I heard her sing with such freely flowing luscious beauty of voice—and also such beauty of phrasing—as in "He Shall Feed His Flock"; and the improvement can be heard in lesser degree in the other pieces. Least satisfactory is "Es ist vollbracht," where possibly she is hampered by a rhythmically amorphous accompaniment that has one groping for the structural outlines of the piece. In my review set grit is heard with the sound near the centers of the records.

The sets of Glière's "Ilya Mourometz" Symphony and Fauré's Requiem have not yet arrived; and that leaves E. Power Biggs's single disc (18292, \$1) with simple but satisfying performances on the organ of Bach's beautiful Chorale "Jesu, Joy of Man's Desiring" and Brahms's surprisingly unpretentious and engaging Chorale-Prelude "Es ist ein Ros' entsprungen," which is here recorded for the first time. Personally I prefer to hear Bach's chorale in its original form for chorus and orchestra, as it is recorded on Columbia DB-507.

From Columbia there is Dvorak's

Quartet Op. 51, one of his best works, well played by the Busch Quartet (Set 480, \$4.50); but I prefer the Lener Quartet performance in Columbia Set 369 for its greater tonal beauty. My copy of the new set has several noisily defective surfaces. Columbia also gives us Chabrier's *Trois Valses romantiques* for two pianos, played by Robert and Gaby Casadesus (Set X-209, \$2). Nos. 1 and 2 are moderately good; No. 3 I know to be hauntingly beautiful from the way Balanchine uses it in the most affecting episode of "Cotillon"; but I would not know it from the way it is rattled off on this record. My copy of this set also has defective surfaces.

You would do better to choose Beecham's performance of the Hungarian March from Berlioz's "Damnation of Faust" rather than that of Barlow with the Columbia Broadcasting Symphony on a Columbia single (71287-D, \$1), with the Coronation March from Meyerbeer's "Prophète" on the reverse side. And Toch's "Pinocchio," subtitled "A Merry Overture," and well enough performed by Stock with the Chicago Symphony (11665-D, \$1), can be neglected.

In addition to the ballets discussed by Virginia Mishnun the Ballet Theater gave "Giselle," with Markova's performance which some day will be as legendary as the dancing of Taglioni, whom she impersonated enchantingly in the performance of "Pas de Quatre." And though Markova did not bring to the part of the young bride in "Lilac Garden" the youthfully romantic warmth it asks for and usually has, her cool classical distinction made the performance exciting in an unusual way. "Princess Aurora" offered Baronova in feats of virtuosity that were increasingly difficult and increasingly boring, with an agonizing climax in circus-style even to the accompanying snare-drum-roll. Its Blue Bird variation required of Ian Gibson only his breath-taking air-turns and other technical feats; but in "The Specter of the Rose" he proved unable to create the continuous line of movement in which such turns and leaps are important points. His dancing, in other words, was largely raw technique—without maturity, without style; whereas maturity and style were striking in Yura Lazowsky's brilliantly virile dancing, and contributed largely to making him—even in the small things he was given to do—the company's outstanding male dancer.

B. H. HAGGIN

Letters to the Editors

Why No Negro College Teachers?

Dear Sirs: Cynicism about democracy is tragically widespread in this critical hour, and nowhere is it more in evidence than among the Negro citizens of our country. On every hand one can hear Negroes saying, "Is it worth our while to die to defend a system that doesn't let us live?"

The government, recognizing the basic economic causes of the disillusionment of Negroes, has taken some steps toward correcting the condition. The President's recent order forbidding any form of discrimination in civil-service employment is one such step.

We wish to direct attention to another area, not as important perhaps in point of numbers affected but extremely significant in its implications, where restriction of employment opportunities for Negro workers has done great spiritual and physical damage. We refer to the field of college teaching.

The facts are clear. There is not a single Negro professor in any one of the four free colleges of New York City. The sole Negro ever permitted to teach in the City College was the well-known Dr. Yergan, the popularity of whose courses increased steadily over a four-year period; but in spite of the obvious ability of the man and the growing attendance at his lectures, his status was never above that of special lecturer. Last spring the authorities took advantage of a general hysteria to dismiss him. It is true that Dr. Reddick, another Negro scholar, has been appointed in place of Dr. Yergan, but interested committees report their belief that the City College has little interest in the continuation of the course or in engaging other Negro instructors.

The four free colleges of New York City employ more than a thousand instructors of various ranks. Why should there not be a proper proportion of Negroes on faculties which serve a city one-tenth of whose citizens are Negro? If the principle of proportional employment were carried out, there would be close to one hundred Negroes in the four colleges instead of the one at present so precariously on the pay roll.

The situation throughout the country is no better than in New York City.

Only in Negro colleges, such as Howard and Tuskegee, are any large number of Negro intellectuals employed as teachers. For example, of seventy-five Negroes who obtained Ph.D.'s between 1931 and 1941 and who are teaching in colleges, only one is employed in other than a Negro college.

The excuse has been advanced by some persons, including some college presidents, that no Negroes are qualified to teach in our colleges. Is this true or merely another reflection of the Jim Crow attitude which leads the United States navy, for example, to find no Negroes competent to serve as gunners, machinists, radio operators, or in any other capacity than that of mess boys and lavatory attendants?

The Committee for the Advancement of Negro Studies in the Colleges has been provoked by this challenge to attempt some research. Its findings, even after a superficial study, are conclusive and startling. In the ten-year period from 1931 to 1941 more than 170 Negroes earned Ph.D.'s at colleges and universities of the highest standing in the United States, exclusive of Negro universities and honorary degrees. This should be a sufficient answer to the cry that there are no Negroes qualified to teach in our colleges. It must be pointed out that many teachers at present employed in our colleges do not have the Ph.D. degree. Many are given the opportunity to acquire it while earning and learning at the college itself. Surely most persons qualified to study for a Ph.D. degree should be qualified to teach, especially in the college which grants the degree. But only one of these 171 Negro Ph.D.'s from non-Negro colleges has been allowed to teach. For example, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Michigan, Ohio State, Harvard, the University of Chicago, Cornell, and Columbia have each given thirteen or more degrees to Negro scholars between 1931 and 1941. But only the University of Chicago has given a teaching job to one of these qualified Negro American intellectuals. If these scholars still have faith in democratic processes, is it not a miracle?

What are the present occupations of these Negro Ph.D.'s? As far as could be ascertained, they are grouped as follows: seventy-five are teaching in col-

leges (seventy-four in Negro colleges, one in a "white" college); six are teaching in elementary and high schools; six are in other professions; and the occupations of eighty-four are unknown.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this research is that a situation exists in American intellectual life that is a gross mockery of the ideals of democracy. What steps must be taken to change it? First, the free colleges must lead the way by employing Negro instructors in ever-increasing numbers until a condition of proportional parity has been reached. Suitable instructors are immediately available, if nowhere else, on the staffs of the so-called "Negro" universities, which can be relied upon to employ more Negro scholars than the other institutions for some time. In the meantime the President's stand against discrimination must be adopted as a basic principle by such groups as the Board of Higher Education of New York City. Second, governmental agencies, backed by people's committees and organizations, must demand the employment of Negro teachers in the privately endowed colleges and universities. Third, the colleges, public and private, must take up the serious task of equipping an ever-growing number of young Negro scholars, supplying the aid, financial and other, that will enable them to succeed in obtaining degrees and college teaching posts. And, finally, there must be promoted a program of studies in Negro history and culture that will inspire Negro and white students, and college authorities as well, with proper respect for the contribution of the Negro to the development of our American heritage.

Committee for the Advancement
of Negro Studies
New York, January 2

Shelter for a Mobile Army

Dear Sirs: With every industrial nation concentrating on the production of bombers aimed at maximum property damage, you might think we would begin to adapt the *targets* to the changed conditions. We are told what single bomb hits already have done to huge hangars at Hickam Field, to super-barracks at Wheeler Field, and to super-battleships at Pearl Harbor—all from

putting as many eggs in one basket as if the bomber did not exist. Meanwhile, we go right on designing ships, barracks, hangars, storage depots, hospitals, and super-housing projects in the identical pre-bomber mode, as if the chief considerations were the pleasure of the pet contractors, labor unions, and materials purveyors on the receiving end. Army and navy egos continue to be gratified, apparently, at American ability to pay for elephantiasis and extravagance without thought that they are creating bomb targets no enemy with a glass eye can miss. Otherwise, why since the last World War has there been no progress in the design of military shelter forms?

Obviously such forms have lagged a generation behind (a) the swiftly growing mobility of military science; (b) the growing range and destructiveness of the bomber; (c) the world scale of military actions; (d) the danger of waiting till *after* an enemy threatens from some unexpected point before sending tradition-minded contractors, technicians, and craftsmen and traditionally handicraft tools and raw materials to build targets that can't possibly house our forces until *months* subsequently—if they aren't all captured in the meantime, as at Wake Island.

No army can be any more mobile than its shelter. How are we to surprise the enemy if forced to advertise a year beforehand for bids to build the base the attack is to be launched from? Just as we are in the midst of spending a billion dollars to fortify a dozen foreign bases, the enemy attacks us elsewhere. Shall we spread ourselves so thin over the globe as to be strong nowhere, or shall we begin to realize that the day of defensive bases has gone with the bomber, that attack is the only defense, and that for attack our troops need small, insulated, prefabricated, demountable shelter units they can carry compactly with them and erect and dismantle themselves in minutes—when and where they *attack*?

Prefabrication of a somewhat saner type than army engineers have evolved could meet this problem except for the unwillingness of military men to accept civilian advice, plus the resistance of those who profit from keeping shelter complicated, expensive, handicraft, conservative, and monumentally built for display or permanence. Must we, for the sake of those who fought Representative Engel's attempt to reduce the cost of military shelter and for the sake of those who pulled the behind-the-scenes

wires against the Currier contract for prefabricated houses in the Detroit area, delay housing suitable to our army's mobility, thereby frustrating its ability to launch a surprise attack where the enemy is vulnerable at the time of its own choosing? Shall we dissipate our energies on fixed bases, none of which can be particularly strong, and tie our forces down by their coat-tails to defensive positions?

What shall we pay in blood, defeat, and destruction for the hindsighted inertia of those who, living in an era of mobility and property destruction, persist in thinking of military shelter in terms of giantism, immobility, and cost-plus swank permanence? Either we shall crawl out of ruts beloved by those who profit from such grandfatherly ineptitude or we shall be blown out. Immediately, unless we itch for a licking, we should put fewer military eggs in one basket, reduce target area, diffuse the targets at each camp, cease all construction for conspicuous display, and provide light, low-cost, insulative, demountable shelter units adequate for any climate, and thus make our army irresistibly *mobile* in attack.

CORWIN WILLSON

New York, January 5

Lerner vs. Chamberlain

Dear Sirs: Except for the fact that it had very little to do with the book, John Chamberlain's review of "Ideas for the Ice Age" in your issue of December 6 was first-rate reading. It had some good quips, it said some nice things about my style, and it carried on a long-standing debate in which John and I have been indulging ourselves on the possibilities of economic planning and democratic socialism. But this review might better have been written of any of my previous books, since what I have written about planning and socialism is found chiefly in them. I had flattered myself that there are ideas in my new book which I had not developed to the same extent in earlier books. But since Chamberlain never so much as mentions them, perhaps I am wrong. Maybe book reviewing is supposed to be a form of public debate, and maybe Chamberlain was right to address his review primarily to a chapter in my book which had originally been written as a review of his "American Stakes."

He challenges me at the end of his article to a debate with either him or Willi Schlamm. I would be glad to take part in one with either or both of them, on

any topic, including economic planning, democratic socialism, methods of winning the war, or the nature of a post-war world. I will do it orally or in writing or in any other sign or symbol language they may choose. But I would still like to know sometime what Chamberlain thinks of my book.

MAX LERNER

New York, December 22

Reves, British Journalist

Dear Sir: In your issue of December 6 Franz Hoellering in his review entitled Thyssen Explains refers to me as "the Hungarian journalist, Emery Reves." It is true that I was born in Hungary, but I am a naturalized British subject and am very proud of it. At the moment when Great Britain, which is my country and to which I owe all my allegiance, is at war with Hungary, I resent being referred to as a Hungarian and shall be grateful if you will publish this rectification

EMERY REVES

New York, December 10

CONTRIBUTORS

HEINZ POL, a German émigré journalist, is the author of "Suicide of a Democracy."

HAROLD STRAUSS is an associate editor of the publishing firm of Alfred A. Knopf.

GEORGE BARKER is an English poet now living in this country. A volume of his "Selected Poems" has just been published.

CHARLES CURTIS MUNZ has written extensively on the economic and political problems of the United States. He is the author of "Land Without Moses."

KARL LOEWENSTEIN is professor of political science at Amherst College.

GRACE ADAMS is the author of several books on psychology and of a sociological study entitled "Workers on Relief."

INFORMATION FOR SUBSCRIBERS

THE NATION, 55 Fifth Ave., New York. Price 15 cents a copy. By subscription—Domestic: One year \$5; Two years \$8; Three years \$11. Additional Postage per year: Foreign, \$1; Canadian, \$1. The Nation is indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Index to Labor Articles, Public Affairs Information Service, Dramatic Index. Two weeks' notice and the old address as well as the new are required for change of address.